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I. INTRODUCTION

Environmental law demands foresight. Much environmental
law seeks to prevent dangers that "may reasonably be anticipated,"'

2
invoking precaution against future risks before they occur. Even
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Review" at Duke University, 2015-16 (including Ed Balleisen, Lori Bennear, Elizabeth Brake,
Josh Bruce, Mercy DeMenno, Andrea Renda, and our team of graduate and undergraduate
students), for extensive discussion and support.
E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 108 (2004).
1.
2.
E.g., Ethyl Corp. v. United States, 541 F.2d 377, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For a recent
review of precaution in environmental law, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Precautionand Climate
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environmental laws that seek to remedy past damage and
restore ecological systems still depend on foreseeing the future
effects of such measures. Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA)-the flagship of modern environmental law, now adopted
around the world-calls for foresight before taking action. 3
Similarly, Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)-required by
every United States (U.S.) President of the past four decades,
and increasingly adopted in other countries-has emphasized
prospective ex ante assessment of the future impacts of proposed
new rules or rule revisions. 4 Each of these impact assessment
(IA) tools incorporates, to some degree, the analytic methods of
risk assessment (RA) and cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
Yet foresight is inevitably imperfect. Humans may be
unusual among species in trying to make decisions via foresight,
by envisioning hypothetical scenarios of future consequences
(and how they will feel about them),5 but humans also tend to
be flawed forecasters.6 Choosing among options is challenging,
because anticipating the consequences of alternative actions
involves foreseeing future outcomes with and without each
option and furthermore foreseeing future preferences about
these outcomes. 7 Even when making decisions with the best
intentions, humans are susceptible to biases and heuristics.
The future scenarios that the human brain constructs tend to
be made of collages of memories, which helps explain why
humans tend to overemphasize events that they recall as more
salient (the availability heuristic).8 Humans may overstate the

importance of their current state of affairs as a reference point
Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE LAW (Cinnamon Carlarne et

al., eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2016).
3.
The U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.,
requires federal agencies to stop and think ahead about the reasonably foreseeable significant
environmental impacts of their major actions. On the international adoption of EIA, see NEIL
CRAIK, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Cambridge Univ.

Press, 2008). On EIA as policy foresight and its international diffusion, see Jonathan B.
Wiener & Daniel L. Ribeiro, Impact Assessment: Diffusion and Integration, in COMPARATIVE
LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS (Francesca

Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016).
4.
See Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3.
5.
See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 81-106 (Vintage Canada ed. 2009).
6.
Id.; LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD'S WALK: How RANDOMNESS RULES OUR
LIVES (Vintage Books 2008); PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE
ART AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION (Crown 2015); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOW (1st ed. 2011); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE
OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (Random House 2005).

7.
GILBERT, supra note 5.
8.
Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection:Experiencing the Future, 317
SCIENCE 1351 (2007); D. L. Schacter, D. R. Addis & R. L. Buckner, Episodic Simulation of
FutureEvents: Concepts, Data, and Applications, 1124 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCE 39 (2008).
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(status quo bias); they may find it difficult to appreciate
randomness, expecting to see a cause behind every event; they
may attribute patterns when there is only noise; and they may
overstate the skills or errors of the decision maker.9
Benjamin Franklin understood both the need for foresight and
its inescapable imperfection when he advised his friend, the British
scientist Joseph Priestley, who was considering whether to accept a
job offer made by Lord Shelburne to work as the librarian and tutor
of Shelburne's children.1 0 Franklin proposed a process of envisioning
and weighing "all the Reasons pro and con" for each decision option,
recognizing that:
tho' the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the
Precision of Algebraic Quantities, yet, when each is thus
considered ... and the whole lies before me, I think I can
judge better, and am less liable to make a rash Step; and*
in fact I have found great Advantage from this kind of
Equation, in what may be called Moral or Prudential
Algebra."
Taking Franklin's advice, Priestley considered his objectives and
collected information on Lord Shelburne and his offer. 12 He sought
to foresee and weigh the possible consequences of his alternatives
and make his decision.1 3 Yet, as Franklin noted, even such foresight
is inevitably imprecise.
Foresight can be improved, notably through astute hindsight:
learning from the past. 14 The key is to reassess past foresight
in light of experience and thereby increase the accuracy of our

MLODINOW, supra note 6, at 9 (mentioning examples of how adverse outcomes can
9.
be misperceived as indicative of bad decisions or bad decision skills).
10. JOHN TOWILL RUTr, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: VOLUME I
180 (1831).
11. Benjamin Franklin, Letter to Joseph Priestley (September 19, 1772), in BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS, WITH INTRODUCTION, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES

348-49 (Frank Luther Mott & Chester E. Jorgenson, eds., New York: American Book
Company). The context and influence of Franklin's letter on the development of CBA is
discussed in Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Richard L. Revesz

& Michael A. Livermore eds., 2013); RUr, supra note 10, at 182-183. The discussion of
Priestley's decision making process before and after Franklin's advice is also mentioned in
CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, DECISIVE: How TO MAKE BETIER CHOICES IN LIFE AND WORK

(2013).
12. See RUTT, supra note 10, at 178, 181, 183, 185, 188.
13. Id.
14. TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 6, at 13 ("Forecast, measure, revise. Repeat. It's a
never ending process of incremental improvement that explains why weather forecasts are
good and slowly getting better. ... [W]ithout revision, there can be no improvement.").
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foresight methods.1 5 Informing foresight from hindsight is an
essential inferential method of science. From hypothesis
testing through experimentation and observation, to the BayesLaplace Theory of updating prior beliefs, the essence of
scientific inquiry is that additional information can enable us
to test past assumptions and predictions and improve our ability
to foresee.16
In this sense, environmental law needs to learn1 7 to improve
its foresight via hindsight-it needs to couple prospection with
retrospection. The point of such retrospection is not to return to
a past state of the world; it is not a reactionary nostalgia, but
rather a reflective (at times bittersweet) process of learning.1 8
Measuring past forecasts against policy performance can promote
learning and improvement in subsequent decisions. Such a forecastrevise-adapt approach is a central feature of the new wave of
developments in artificial intelligence and deep learning.1 9 It can
be part of our legal institutions as well.
IA, developed in the U.S. and diffused throughout the world,
has become the institutional and legal mechanism for policy
foresight. 20 As noted, EIA and RIA have both been adopted
widely as prospective ex ante procedures for policy foresight,
seeking to foster environmental quality and better regulation. 2 1
The emphasis of both RIA and EIA over the past five decades
has been prospective: estimating the future consequences of a
policy decision. 22 Researchers have observed that these ex ante
forecasts may, understandably, exhibit significant uncertainties
15.

See generally id.

16. SHARON BERTSCH MCGRAYNE, THE THEORY THAT WOULD NOT DIE: How BAYES'
RULE CRACKED THE ENIGMA CODE, HUNTED DOWN RUSSIAN SUBMARINES, AND EMERGED
TRIUMPHANT FROM Two CENTURIES OF CONTROVERSY (Reprint ed. 2012); MLODINOW, supra

note 6.
17. For an early call to incorporate learning into environmental law, including through
experimentation and review, see Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning
Experience, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 791 (1994).
18.

SVETLANA BOYM, THE FUTURE OF NOSTALGIA (Basic Books 2008).

19. Nicola Lettieri, Computational Social Science, the Evolution of Policy Design
and Rule Making in Smart Societies, 8 FUTURE INTERNET 19 (2016); Rise of the
Machines, ECONOMIST (May 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21650526artificial-intelligence-scares-peopleexcessively-so-rise-machines.
20. Wiener & Ribeiro, supranote 3.
21. Wiener, supra note 11. See Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3.
22. See Jos Arts, Paula Caldwell & Angus Morrison-Saunders, Environmental Impact
Assessment Follow-up: Good Practice and Future Directions-Findingsfrom a Workshop at
the LAIA 2000 Conference, 19 IMPACT ASSESS. PROJ. APPRAIS. 175, 175-85 (2001); JOSEPH
ALDY, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF
AGENCY RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

REGULATORY POLICY 7 (2014); EUR. COMM'N, Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM
(2010) 543 final, at 3 (Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter EC, Smart Regulation].
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and inaccuracies. 23 Several studies have found that only a
plurality of ex ante IAs turn out to be accurate (even defined
loosely as +/- 25%), with errors of both overestimation and
underestimation of actual impacts, for reasons including: industry
overestimation of costs, assumptions of static technology followed
24
by actual innovation, and mis-projection of compliance rates.
In some cases, the ex ante IA may appear inaccurate because
the policy was changed after the ex ante IA was prepared on a
25
prior version of the policy. Yet there have still been "only . . . a
26
handful" of retrospective studies of prospective accuracy, and
they have examined only partial samples which may not be
27
representative of the broader universe of policies and IAs.
Governments have increasingly called for regular conduct of
retrospective review or ex post IA, chiefly to secure cost savings
28 Retrospective
or other gains from revising older regulations.
review of existing regulations was the objective of section 5 of
President Bill Clinton's Executive Order (EO) 12,866 (1993)29;
section 6 of President Barack Obama's EO 13,563 (2011)30;
President Obama's EO 13,579 (2011) calling on independent
agencies to conduct similar reviewS 3 1; President Obama's EO
32
13,610 (2012) giving further details on the review proceSS ; and

&

23. See Adam Finkel, The Cost of Nothing Trumps the Value of Everything: The Failure
of Regulatory Economics to Keep Pace with Improvements in Quantitative Risk Analysis, 4
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 91 (2014).
24. See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern & Peter Nelson, On the Accuracy
of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000); OFFICE OF MGMT.
BUDGET, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2005) [hereinafter 0MB

2005 REPORT]; Winston Harrington, GradingEstimates of the Benefits and Costs of Federal
Regulation: A Review of Reviews, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2006); Richard D.
Morgenstern, The RFF Regulatory Performance Initiative: What Have We Learned?,
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE (2015) [hereinafter Morgenstern, RFFJ.
25. Such changes could occur during the legislative/rulemaking process after the ex
ante IA is prepared, or during implementation after adoption of the policy. One of the main
criticisms of ex ante IA expressed by some officials from Directorates-General of the European
Commission is that the proposed policy action examined in the ex ante IA gets significantly
amended after the proposal leaves the Commission and traverses the European Parliament
and Council-without an update to the IA to assess the impacts of the final policy action.
Interview with Two Officials from Directorates-General of the European Commission (2015),
on file with authors.
26. Finkel, supra note 23, at 118.
27. See id.
28. See infra Section III.
29. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). Previously, President
Jimmy Carter's Exec. Order 12,044 (1978) addressed review of existing regulations in §§
2(d)(8) and 4;. and President Ronald Reagan's Exec. Order 12,291 (1981) addressed review of
existing regulations in § 3(i).
30. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
31. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 11, 2015).
32. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 10. 2012).

JOURNAL OFLAND USE

6

[Vol. 32:1

the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) recommendation number 5 on regulatory policy and
governance (2012).33 The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
requires agencies to review within 10 years of issuance those
regulations that have "a significant economic impact upon a
substantial number of small entities." 34 Some statutes require
reviews every few years. 35 The Administrative Conference of
the United States (ACUS) endorsed the call for retrospective review
as early as 1995 (just after the Clinton EO), 3 6 commissioned
an expert appraisal in 2014 by Joseph Aldy of retrospective
review efforts to date (soon after the Obama EO), 3 7 and adopted
a set of recommendations in late 2014 for strengthening
retrospective review.38 Countries around the world have been
adopting versions of retrospective review (whether called ex
post IA, follow up policy evaluation, post-implementation review,
retrospective review, or otherwise). 39
Yet, these government measures to require retrospective
review have not yet fulfilled the goal that we emphasize here:
using retrospective review to learn to improve prospective
review-using hindsight to improve foresight. Calls for
retrospective review have yielded only partial and slow progress
in practice. After his term at the helm of Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), where he was a key architect of
the Obama administration's retrospective review orders and
supervised their implementation, Cass Sunstein wrote that
"[i]t is an astonishing fact that until very recently, there has
been no sustained effort to gather, let alone act on, that
information [about what regulatory policies actually do]-and

33. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON
REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE (2012).

34. 5 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1) (2012).
35. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (requiring reviews of national ambient air quality
standards [NAAQS] every five years).
36. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 95-3, Review of Existing Agency
Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,109 (Aug. 18, 1995).
37. ALDY, supranote 22.
38. Admin. Conference of the U.S., Recommendation 2014-5, Retrospective Review of
Agency Rules, adopted December 4, 2014, at 79 Fed. Reg. 75,114, 75,114-117 (Dec. 17, 2014).
ACUS Recommendation 5(c) notes that one factor in selecting rules for retrospective analysis
is "[u]ncertainty about the accuracy of initial estimates of regulatory costs and benefits." Id.
at 75,116. Retrospective review was also advocated by the American Bar Association. SECTION
OF ADMIN. LAw AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, AM. BAR Assoc., IMPROVING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 12-13 (2016), http://www.

americanbar.orgcontent/dam/abaladministrative/administrative-law/Final%20POTUS%20
Report%2010-26-16.authcheckdam.pdf
39.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REGULATORY POLICY OUTLOOK

[hereinafter OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK].

§

5 (2015)

Fall, 2016]

REGULATION GOING RETRO

7

that existing efforts remain highly preliminary and partial." 40
The Aldy report found that the Obama administration's measures
generated retrospective reviews of several hundred specific rules,
and helped build a culture of retrospective review; however, the
track record remained "mixed" and very few of the administration's
newly issued rules were revisions based on a retrospective review
or required a future retrospective review. 4 1 Cary Coglianese
observed that "retrospective review is today where prospective
analysis was in the 1970s: ad hoc and largely unmanaged." 42 OECD
remarked: "ex post evaluation by [U.S.] federal agencies remains
patchy and unsystematic."a
It is understandable that agencies told to conduct retrospective
reviews may see this task as low priority compared to issuing the
new policies demanded by Congress, the President, and the public;
an agency may hesitate to conduct reviews that might cast doubt on
its own past analyses, or subject its policies to revision or rescission.
Hence, there is a need for presidential exhortation (or another
institutional mechanism) to promote retrospective review. The
Obama Administration continued to seek and report additional
retrospective reviews by agencies each year."
So far, government retrospective review has mainly been
aimed at assessing each regulatory policy individually, with a view
to revising that specific policy, often to reduce its cost burden. 45
In this article, we argue that the retrospective review effort should
be broader, assessing the comprehensive scope of important impacts
(not only costs, but also benefits and ancillary impacts, with a
view not just to reducing burdens, but also to increasing net

40. Cass R. Sunstein, The Regulatory Look-Back, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 588 (2014).
41. ALDY, supra note 22, at 4-6. Similarly, Sofie Miller studied twenty-two rules
promulgated in 2014 and found that very few included plans for future retrospective review.
Sofie E. Miller, Learningfrom Experience:Retrospective Review of Regulations in 2014 (Geo.
Wash. U. Regulatory Studies Ctr., Working Paper, 2015), https://regulatorystudies.
2
columbian.gwu.edulearning-experience-retrospective-review-regulations- 014.
30
YALE J. ON REG.
Lookback,
Regulatory
with
Forward
Moving
Coglianese,
42. Cary
57, 59 (2013).
43. OECD, PoLicY OUTLOOK, supranote 39, at 123; see also Randall Lutter, Regulatory
Policy: What Role For Retrospective Analysis and Review?, 4 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS, 1738 (2013) (similar).
44. See, e.g., Howard Shelanski, Making All Levels of Government More Efficient and
Effective Through Retrospective Review, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/04/making-all-levels-government-more-efficient-and-effectivethrough-retrospective (reporting on "more than 50 new retrospective initiatives" and stating
that the administration's "regulatory lookback effort to date [since 20111 has achieved an
estimated $28 billion in net 5-year savings"). Howard Shelanski was the Administrator of
OIRA during President Obama's second term.
45. See infra Section II.
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benefits).4 6 Furthermore, we argue that retrospective review should
emphasize learning-by assessing larger and representative
samples of multiple ex post IAs compared to ex ante IAs, in
order to improve foresight through more accurate ex ante IA
methodologies and to learn about better policy designs. 47 Under
EO 13,563, "each agency is directed to use the best available
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and
costs as accurately as possible"48-which should include using
retrospective review to test and improve the accuracy of prospective
IA. Cary Coglianese recommends "rigorous retrospective review
[of multiple rules sharing common estimation issues] to evaluate
their benefits and costs retrospectively [and] help validate or
improve prospective estimation techniques applicable to other
rules." 49 Aldy likewise notes the value of using retrospective review
(ex post IA) to test and improve the accuracy of methodologies
for prospective ex ante IA.50
46. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011), recognizes the possibility
that retrospective review will find that a rule is "insufficient" as well as that it is "outmoded,
ineffective . .. or excessively burdensome" (section 6), but the emphasis so far has been on
reducing costs; see Shelanski, supra note 44 (noting large cost savings, but also an example
of expanding federal policy on hearing aids). A useful analogy may be to outcomes studies in
medical care, the objective of which is not necessarily to reduce (or increase) medication, but
to improve patient health outcomes; similarly, retrospective review should be aimed
evenhandedly not at reducing (or increasing) regulation, but at improving societal outcomes.
See Jonathan B. Wiener, Managingthe latrogenicRisks ofRisk Management, 9 RISK: HEALTH
SAFETY & ENVT 39, 78-79 (1998) (proposing national outcomes studies of regulation, akin to
outcomes studies in medicine).
47. OIRA appears to agree with this goal of using retrospective IA to enhance the
accuracy of prospective IAProspective analysis may overestimate or underestimate both benefits and costs;
retrospective analysis can be important as a corrective mechanism.[9] Executive
Orders 13563 and 13610 specifically call for such analysis, with the goal of
improving relevant regulations through modification, streamlining, expansion, or
repeal. The aim of retrospective analysis is to improve understanding of the
accuracy of prospective analysis and to provide a basis for potentially modifying
rules as a result of ex post evaluations. Rules should be written and designed to
facilitate retrospective analysis of their effects, including consideration of the data
that will be needed for future evaluation of the rules' ex post costs and benefits.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM

ACT 6 (2016) (with footnote 9 citing Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent
Regulatory Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION (David
Moss & John Cisternino, eds., 2009)). However, in response to two commenters on the 2015
draft report who suggested that OMB should report the findings of retrospective reviews
alongside OMB's reports of agencies' prospective IAs for major rules over the past decade,
OMB replied that it hopes the agencies and outside researchers will do so. Id. at 109.
48. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
49. Coglianese, supra note 42, at 65.
50. ALDY, supra note 22, at 22-26. See also Adam J. White, Retrospective Review, for
Tomorrow's Sake, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Nov. 28, 2016),
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President Obama declared in his 2009 inaugural address
that "[t]he question we ask today is not whether our government
is too big or too small, but whether it works."5 1 Regulations
can protect environmental quality and public health, but if
poorly designed or if conditions change, they can also induce
new problems. 52 If policy makers try to foresee the expected
consequences of proposed policy actions, then efforts should be
undertaken to validate these forecasts and improve their accuracy
over time. Without a mechanism to learn what really works and how
well (or poorly), it will be unknown if government policies are
achieving their intended or optimal outcomes, and the government
will not be able to improve its foresight for subsequent policy
decisions. Without ex post review, ex ante IA can err in foreseeing
impacts, and can more easily be used to justify a policy choice
53
already taken, rather than to learn about actual impacts.
Sections II and III of this article trace the evolution of IA,
first the rise and diffusion of ex ante analysis and then the more
limited emergence of ex post review, including EIA, RIA, and other
related tools intended to improve policy decisions and increa-se
accountability. Section IV offers an original contribution to the
literature with a new empirical analysis of agency reporting dataon
the extent to which U.S. environmental regulation-in particular,
regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-is
going retro, in the sense of incorporating a learning mechanism by
which hindsight can improve foresight. We find low levels of
implementation of ex post EIA and RIA, and a focus on reducing
the cost burden of each policy taken individually, rather than
evaluation of a comprehensive scope of impacts or multi-policy
retrospective to test and learn to improve the accuracy of
prospective IA. Section V comments on the possible causes of
http://yalejreg.com/nc/retrospective-review-for-tomorrows-sake-by-adam-j-white/
("retrospective review's greatest virtue actually has nothing to do with repealing regulations.
Rather, retrospective review's greatest value is forward-looking ... to confront how accurate
or inaccurate the agencies' own projections were in forecasting the rules' impacts in the first
place.").
51.

Barrack

Obama,

INAUGURAL

ADDRESS

BY

BARACK OBAMA,

Jan.

http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-barack-obamavisited Jan. 21, 2017).

21,

2 00 9

2009,

(last

52. Wiener, supra note 11, at 124; JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VS.
RIsle TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Harvard Univ. Press,

1995). As regulatory impacts affect different people, further analysis is needed to assure a
fair distribution of welfare. See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION:

BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).; Matthew D. Adler, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Distributional Weights: An Overview (Duke Envtl. & Energy Econ., Working
Paper EE 13-05, 2013), http://scholarship.law.duke.edulfaculty--scholarship/3110.
53. See Claudio M. Radaelh, Rationality, Power, Management and Symbols: Four
Images of Regulatory Impact Assessment, 33 SCANDINAVIAN. POL. STUDIES 164-188, 171
(2010) (mentioning the de-coupling of the "talk" and practice of regulatory assessment
instruments).
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and remedies for the shortcomings we have observed, and makes
recommendations for future research and for institutional reforms
to improve the implementation of ex post IA, so better foresight can
evolve from better hindsight.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FORESIGHT

U.S. environmental law has evolved by progressively
incorporating analytical tools and methods of policy foresight.
Four such tools gained importance as not only methods for
improving regulation and other policy decisions, but also as
measures to increase accountability and better communicate
decisions to the public. The early application of CBA to government
infrastructure projects laid the methodological basis for the
subsequent deployment of prospective EIA and RIA. Similarly,
formal methods of prospective RA were developed to inform
policy decisions.
A. CBA of InfrastructureProjects
The conceptual elements of CBA were evident in Benjamin
Franklin's letter to Joseph Priestley in 1772, quoted above. 54 There
is some evidence that these ideas then influenced pivotal thinkers
in late 18th century Paris, notably Jeremy Bentham and French
engineer-economists such as Jules Dupuit (professor at the Ecole
des Ponts et Chauss6es), and the French military engineers later
brought these ideas back to America to train the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (Army Corps).55 CBA in U.S. policymaking first
appeared as a practice of the Army Corps in selecting projects.5 6
With the beginning of the professionalization of the civil service
in the 1880s, the Army Corps began to develop a systematized
planning process for designing and choosing priorities for
infrastructure projects based on economic analysis of anticipated
costs and benefits.5 7 The longstanding use of CBA by the Army
Corps' archetype, the French Corps des Ponts et Chaussees, was
a direct influence.5 8 Since 1807, the French Corps had been
quantifying and monetizing the social costs and benefits of
infrastructure projects as a method of measuring their "public
54. Franklin, supra note 11.
55. See Wiener, supra note 11.
56. See THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS ch. 7, at 148 (Princeton Univ. Press,
1996).
57. Id. at 151.
58. Id. at 148, 150.
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59
utility" and ranking different projects competing for public funds.
French influence-starting with engineers assisting the Americans
during the Revolutionary War-combined with the distinct political
setting under which the U.S. Army Corps developed, stimulated the
gradual adoption and implementation of CBA.co
The U.S. Congress played a major role in formalizing
and routinizing CBA in the 20th century by making it a legal
requirement preceding funding decisions for public water
projects-first in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902 (RHA)
6 1 The main
and then in the Flood Control Act of 1936 (FCA).
policy motivations for the two Acts were to improve governance
and promote stronger accountability in public spending; to enhance
the perception of fairness in the selection of water projects; and
to control "pork barrel" politics. 62 The RHA and the FCA
employed different approaches to improving the rationality of
water project funding decisions. The RHA's approach was mainly
institutional, creating an advisory body-a national-level advisory
Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors-but also procedural/
methodological, i.e., creating the possibility of a CBA before the
approval of a water project. 63 The FCA, on the other hand, built
upon the RHA to transform CBA into a binding normative standard

for Congressional approval of funds for every public water project.

4

The standard introduced by the FCA for Congressional approval
was "if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess
of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of
people are otherwise adversely affected."6 5 For the two types
59.
60.

Id. at 120.
Wiener, supra note 11, at 134; PORTER, supra note 56; See infra note 67; JOE N.

BALLARD, THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

17 (1988)

(on the

participation of French engineers in the Revolutionary War).
61. 33 U.S.C. §§ 541-579 (1902); 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1936).
62.

BEATRICE HORT HOLMES, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS,

1800-1960, at 8 (1972); PORTER, supranote 56, at 149, 155.
63. According to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1902 (RHA):
[I]n the consideration of such works and projects the board shall have in view the
amount and character of commerce existing or reasonably prospective which will be
benefited by the improvement, and the relation of the ultimate cost of such work,
both as to cost of construction and maintenance, to the public commercial interest
involved, and the public necessity for the work and propriety of its construction,
continuance, or maintenance at the expense of the United States.
33 U.S.C. § 541. The Act also stipulated that "all facts, information, and arguments which are
presented to the board for its consideration in connections with any matter referred to it by
the Chief of Engineers shall be reduced to and submitted in writing, and made a part of the
records." Still, the board acted in an advisory board capacity, since only the projects referred
to it by the Chief of Engineers underwent a CBA analysis. Id.
64. See Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1936).
65. Id. § 1(a), 33 U.S.C. § 701(a).
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of studies, forecasting . the positive and negative, direct and
indirect, effects of public projects worked as a preceding step to
the calculation of its net benefits.6 6
The next period of significant methodological and institutional
developments of CBA, as a method for informing and promoting
accountability for policy decisions, occurred between the 1940s and
the late 1960s. To a remarkable extent, the standardization of CBA
methods was a product of American demand for transparency in
government decision-making. 67 To resolve disputes over how to
conduct CBA analyses, the Bureau of the Budget-the predecessor
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)-used powers
vested by EO 9,384 of 1943 and, in 1952, issued Circular A-47 with
the first set of interagency guidelines for CBA of water projects.6 8
Circular A-47 consolidated years of evolution and methodological
debate about CBA, transforming CBA of water and related land
programs and projects into a process of sequential decisions, from
problem definition to the calculation of net benefits.6 9 CBA became
"an essential part of the process of formulating and selecting
projects."7 0 The forecasting nature of CBA was once again evident,
now in the guidelines ("a concise but complete estimate of all
the benefits and all of the economic costs. Because any long-term
66. In the RHA, the idea of forecasting, with its inevitable uncertainty, is explicit in the
use of expression "reasonably prospective" to refer to the estimation of benefits. See id. § 3,
33 U.S.C. § 541.
67. A. R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683-735, 684
(1965); PORTER, supra note 56, at 149, 162 (explaining how the most powerful advocates for
standardized methods of CBA were the opponents of the Army Corps, namely utilities,
railroads, the Soil and Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, and the
Bureau of Reclamation, in the Department of the Interior). Attitudes toward transparency
and access to information differed in France and the U.S., while decisions by the French
Conseil g6n6ral about alternative programs-all backed by economic quantification-were
made in closed session and the Corps des Ponts protected itself by withholding information,
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was compelled to disclose its findings. Id. at 116, 144. In
Porter's view, this transparency was one of the key factors explaining why CBA evolved in
the U.S., surpassing the French approach in methodological sophistication. Id.
68. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-47, REPORTS AND BUDGET ESTIMATES
RELATING TO FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS FOR CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT, OR USE
OF WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES (1952). Circular A-47 established minimum criteria

that would be used by the Executive Ofiice of the President when reviewing proposed water
project reports and budget estimates, with the goal of promoting "more uniform agency
policies and standards," and to inform better priority setting among projects competing for
funds. Id. Circular A-47 was preceded by a series of studies by the Subcommittee on Benefits
and Costs, established in 1946 at the Inter-Agency Committee on Water Resources (IACWR),
with the goal of formulating uniform principles and procedures for CBA of water resources
projects. Executive Order 9,384 of 1943 required agencies to submit to the Bureau of the
Budget reports relating to or affecting Federal public works and improvement projects.
69.

INTER-AGENCY COMM. ON WATER RESOURCES, PROPOSED PRACTICES FOR ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF RIVER BASIN PROJECTS 3, 11, 18, 22 (1958); John F. Timmons, Economic
Framework for Watershed Development, 36 J. FARM ECON. 1170, 1173 (1954).
70. INTER-AGENCY COMM. ON WATER RESOURCES, supranote 69, at 11.
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estimates are subject to wide margins of error, the results should be
expressed in ranges rather than in single figures").7 1
Influenced by the developments in welfare economics, the
use of CBA expanded from water projects to inform project
decisions in other areas, such as health, recreation, and land
use. 72 Soon, planners overseas began to advocate the use of ex
ante "evaluation in planning" centered on CBA as the ideal
73
approach to making rational and transparent planning choices.
Even with methodological limitations, CBA was seen as an
improvement compared to open-ended concepts of the time (e.g.,
"best use of land in the public interest," "a pattern of land use
that is reasonably convenient, pleasing and cheap," or "advantages
and disadvantages"). 7 4
CBA would soon become a key component of IA-in particular in
the U.S.76 During and after the 1970s, several U.S. environmental
statutes incorporated CBA for agency decisions or regulations,
independent of an IA. 7 6

71.

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, supra note 68, at 5; See also INTER-AGENCY COMM. ON

WATER RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 17. When discussing the treatment of risks in CBA, the
IACRW Report mentions:
Risks in the form of uncertainties for which no appropriate basis is available for
prediction include the probability of errors in estimating benefits and costs due to
such factors as fluctuations in levels ofeconomic activity, technological changes and
innovations, and other unforeseeable developments adversely affecting the cost of
value of project services.
INTER-AGENCY COMM. ON WATER RESOURCES, supra note 69, at 23.

72.

Nathaniel Lichfield, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Plan Evaluation, 35 TOwN PLAN. REV.

159, 163 (1964); ROBERT DORFMAN, MEASURING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS;
PAPERS PRESENTED AT A CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS HELD NOVEMBER 7-9, 1963, at 7-9 (1965);

PORTER, supra note 56, at 187 ("The new welfare economics presupposed that all pleasures
and pains in life were commensurable under a single, coherent, quantifiable utility function.
It seemed both intellectually serious and practically useful to try to work this out for such
difficult issues as recreation, health, and the saving or loss of life").
73. Lichfield, supranote 72.
74. Id. at 161, 168.
75. CBA is often a key part of RIA. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING

RATIONALITY:

HOW

COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS

CAN

BETTER

PROTECT

THE

ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (Reprint ed. 2011). But RIA can be undertaken without full
CBA (for example, if RIA takes a goal as given and employs cost-effectiveness analysis).
76. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, § 6(c); the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) Amendments of 1996, authorizing EPA to determine whether
the benefits justify the costs before setting drinking water standards; or the Amended Gas
Pipeline Safety Standards of 1996, requiring CBA before setting safety standards. See Robert
W. Hahn, State and FederalRegulatory Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEG. STUD.
873, 889 (2000).
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B. EIA
The creation of EIA in the U.S. was a landmark in the evolution
of normative frameworks of ex ante IA systems and policy foresight.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (1969) was a
response to the countervailing environmental risks of government
actions by mission oriented-agencies, such as in the transportation
and energy sectors.7 7 EIA became by far the most operational
and significant of NEPA's provisions, covering policy decisions of
different scales, including permits, projects, programs, plans,
regulations, and legislative proposals submitted by the Executive
Branch to Congress. 7 8 The logic of EIA is to improve the
environmental outcomes of government decisions via analysis,
transparency, and public participation in the policy decision process
before implementation.7 9 EIA works as both a precautionary and
evidence-based tool with the potential of avoiding unintended
consequences and unnecessary environmental harms.80
Foresight is at the core of EIA. Agencies must undertake
EIA to foresee the environmental impacts of their actions, as
the language of foresight in the guidelines issued under NEPA
by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) explicitly
indicates.8 1 Regarding uncertainty, CEQ guidelines require

77. 42 U.S.C. § 4321; Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the latrogenic Risks of Risk
Management, 9 RISK 39, 42-43 (1998). NEPA was a reaction against agencies neglecting
environmental impacts. In the early NEPA case of Calvert Cliffs CoordinatingCommittee v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (DC Cir. 1971), Judge Skelly Wright saw in NEPA a requirement of CBA
to include the environmental costs of federal agency projects. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Story
of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the National Environmental Policy Act to Create a
Powerful Cause ofAction, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, 84 (Richard J. Lazarus ed., 2005);
Robert L. Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. LAW REV. 1189, 1279
(1986). Agencies that did not have to prepare CBA analysis of their own projects and major
policy decisions under their own statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Department of Transportation, were most in need of this broader CBA incorporating
environmental impacts. Id. at 1299; JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE:
ADMINISTRATIvE POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 12, 246 (2014); Tarlock, supra note. In the

first 8 years of implementation of NEPA, the Department of Transportation was the agency
most frequently involved in NEPA litigation, with 211 cases. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
THE NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1978). Later, the

U.S. Supreme Court held that NEPA did not impose a substantive CBA requirement, only a
procedural stop and think requirement. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen,
444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980).
78. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(c)(i)-(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
79. See Craik, supranote 3.
80. The required EIS must be prepared and submitted early in the policy process. 40
C.F.R. § 1501.2. EISs should be based "upon the analysis and supporting data from the
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8.
81. Sections 102(c)(i) and (ii) of NEPA includes the core content of EIA, requiring its
report (i.e, the "detailed statement" prepared by the responsible agency official) to include
environmental impacts and adverse environmental effects from the action, without language
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agencies to be clear about the lack of sufficient information
"when an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental
impact statement." 82 When defining which cumulative impacts
and indirect impacts EIA must consider, the guidelines also
83
mention "reasonably foreseeable" impacts and future actions. In
other countries, EIA regulations and guidelines employ language
denoting foresight at the core of EIA.M
From its concise formulation in section 102 (C) of NEPA, EIA
evolved through the 1970s into a sophisticated and detailed set of
guidelines resulting from repeated interactions among Congress,
the President, courts, non-governmental actors, and the CEQ. 85
From the U.S., the concept of EIA diffused throughout the globe
and reached over a hundred countries.8 6 Also, many states in the
U.S. adopted their versions of NEPA (or "little NEPAs"). In less
than nine years, over 10,000 environmental impact statements
(EIS) had been filed before federal agencies in the U.S., and many
times this number of environmental assessments.8 7 In most
countries that have adopted EIA, it only applies to project level
decisions-perhaps because it remained unclear, at least until the
1978 CEQ regulations, which kinds of agency policy decisions would
be considered "major federal actions" to trigger an EIA under

denoting uncertainty, such as "estimates" or "potential." National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, § 102(c)(i)-(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1978). The expression "reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse impacts" is repeated in other provisions of the rule.
83. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1978).
84. In the U.K, for instance, EIAs should include "an estimate, by [the] type and
quantity, of expected residues and emissions (water, air and soil pollution, noise, vibration,
light, heat, radiation, etc[.]) resulting from the operation of the proposed development." Town
and Country Planning Regulations 2011, No. 1824, Schedule 4, Part 1(c). In Canada, EIAs
should consider "environmental effects ... that may occur in connection with the designated
project and any cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result from the designated
project. . . ." S.C. 2012, ch. 19, s. 52, § 19(1)(a). In Australia, a controlled action for which an
environmental assessment may be required should consider as relevant impacts those that
the action "(a) has or will have; or (b) is likely to have." Environmental Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, Compilation No. 51 (2016), Div. 2, 821(1).
85. Herbert F. Stevens, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelinesand Their
Influence on the National Environment Policy Act, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 547, 556 (1973). One
year after CEQ passed its 1978 regulation, the Supreme Court validated its legal force.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1979); accord. Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348-53 (1989); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council,
490 U.S. 360, 377 (1988); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301, 1309-10
(1974).
86. Craik, supra note 3, at 23; Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3.
87. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 77, at 407. In the U.S. federal process,
environmental assessments are preliminary studies aimed at informing the agency decision
whether to conduct a full EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1978).

16

JOURNAL OFLAND USE

[Vol. 32:1

NEPA.8 8 Expanding the scope of EIA to cover programs and plans,
the European Union (EU) and its Member States passed legislation
creating the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). 8 9
C. RIA
RIA was also set up in the U.S. during the 1970s, partly to
help the Executive Branch oversee the flow of rules emanating from
the new environmental and other social legislation passed by
Congress during this period, and modeled in part on EIA.9 When
Congress enacted NEPA in 1969, commentators were discussing the
expansion of CBA from water projects, programs, and budget
planning to agency regulations. 9 ' Responding to concerns over the
compliance costs of new environmental regulations, President
Nixon created the National Industrial Pollution Control Council
and transformed the Bureau of the Budget into its current form of
the OMB. 9 2 The first formulation of what became the RIA in the
U.S. was issued by a memorandum from the OMB Director in
May 1971, creating the Quality of Life Review (QLR). 93 Under
the QLR requirement, every agency had to submit proposed
rules to OMB for review and clearance before publishing a notice

88. Jerry B. Edmonds, The National EnvironmentalPolicy Act Applied to Policy-Level
Decisionmaking, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 799, 799 (1973) (explaining how at first there were doubts on
whether the EIA should cover policy decisions at levels other than the project-level).
89. The creation of SEA as a supposedly distinct tool from EIA can be seen as a
rebranding effort, compared to the option of simply expanding the scope of EIA, as it has been
in the U.S. at least since 1978. "Policies," a category that is usually used to include legislation,
regulation, and policy documents, has not been covered by SEA, except by the 2003 SEA
Protocol to the Espoo Convention, which focuses on transboundary effects. One possible
reason is the overlap with RIA. See infra Section II.D.
90. NEPA was a source of inspiration for the development of the Quality of Life Review,
which responded to the perceived need for an "Economic Impact Statement." Joe Conley II,
Environmentalism Contained: A History of Corporate Responses to the New
Environmentalism 162 (2006).
91. ALLAN SCHMID, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POLICY AND THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET: A
UNIFORM TREATMENT OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND PUBLIC RULES 579-91 (1969). According

to one participant, the tools of benefit-cost analysis and centralized review used at the Army
Corps of Engineers (discussed in Section I.A., supra) were then promoted by Allan Schmid
as a way to oversee regulation generally, and adopted by the Nixon Administration. See Jim
Tozzi, OIRA's Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review
PrecedingOlRA's Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (special ed.) 37, 41-43 (2011).
92. Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 658 (2005); William H. Rodgers
Jr, NationalIndustrialPollution Control Counci* Advise or Collude, 13 BC INDUS. COM. REV.
719 (1971).
93. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB PAPERS: QUALITY OF LIFE REVIEW #1, AGENCY
REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES PERTAINING TO ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND OCCUPATIONAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 2 (1971); see

Tozzi, supra note 91, at 44-45.
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of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). 94 Agencies had to prepare
a summary description containing the principal objectives,
alternatives considered, costs and benefits of each alternative,
9 5 In
and the reason for selecting the preferred alternative.
practice, the QLR was applied almost exclusively to environmental
regulation from the EPA.96
Since the 1970s, every American president of both major
political parties has maintained or expanded the ex ante RIA
framework. In 1978, President Carter issued EO 12,044 and
created the "Regulatory Analysis" requirement, overseen by a
"Regulatory Analysis Review Group."9 7 In 1980, Congress enacted

and President Carter signed the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA),
creating OIRA within OMB.9 8 In 1981, President Reagan issued

EO 12,291, replacing Carter's EO and giving the tool its current
name, the "Regulatory Impact Analysis," as well as giving
OMB/OIRA the authority to oversee RlAs.9 9 In 1993, President
Clinton issued EO 12,866, replacing and improving upon Reagan's
00
EO; subsequent presidents have maintained EO 12,866 in effect.
In 2011, President Obama issued EO 13,563, supplementing
without rescinding EO 12,866,101 notably by requiring retrospective
review as discussed above. 102 In 2003, OIRA issued Circular A-4,
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). Earlier, in 1974, President Ford
(while maintaining the QLR requirement) issued EO 11,821, creating the Inflation Impact
Statement (IIS) (renamed in 1976 "Economic Impact Statements") as an additional
requirement to executive agency rulemaking. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501
(1974); Exec. Order No. 11,949, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,663 (1976).
98. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521).
99. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).
100. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
101. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (2011). The scope of impacts to be covered
has evolved across these EOs. EO 12,044 referred to the "economic consequences" of the
proposed rule, EO 12,044, § 3(b)(1) (not using the word "benefits"). EO 12,291 used the
language of costs and benefits, but without a specific mention of environmental and social
impacts (section 3(d)(1)). Under EOs 12,866 and 13,563, RIA must assess costs and benefits,
including impacts on the environment, public health and safety, and on discrimination or bias
(section 6(a)(3)(C)(i) of EO 12,866 and section 1(b)(3) of EO 13,563). Moreover, EO 12,291
called for benefits to "outweigh" costs, whereas EO 12,866 changed this language to call for
benefits to "justify' costs. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978); Exec. Order
No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
102. See supranotes 29-32. The current RIA framework in the U.S. is comprised mainly
of EOs 12,866, 13,563, and 13,610. But in addition to these basic requirements applicable to
significant rulemaking actions of executive agencies (and EO 13,579 regarding independent
agencies), the overall picture of RIA in the U.S. is more complex and fragmented. In addition
to the RIA, agencies are subject to RIA-like requirements focusing on specific classes of
stakeholders or kinds of impacts, such as on takings of private property (EO 12,630 of 1988),
Indian tribal governments (EO 13,175 of 2000), children (EO 13,045 of 1997), health and
environmental impacts on minorities (EO 12,898 of 1994), and energy (EO 13,211.of 2001). In
1980, drawing inspiration from the same political and economic circumstances of the late-
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which continues to serve as the main RIA guidelines in the
U.S.)oa These EOs use language calling for foresight in RIA.1 04
Similarly, the foresight nature of RIA is evident in Circular A-4's
provisions related to uncertainty.10 5 In addition to using the same
language of the EOs denoting forecasting (e.g., "anticipate and
evaluate the likely consequences of rules"), Circular A-4 has
detailed sections on the uncertainty elements involved in foreseeing
the effects of rules.10 6
Similarly, but less rapidly than EIA, the concept of RIA has
diffused throughout other national and subnational jurisdictions.
At the state level in the U.S., ex ante RIA was adopted by many
states, under different names and with different scopes, also
figuring in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. 0 7

&

1970s, Congress passed two statutes: the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, both calling for ex ante analysis-the RFA, for impacts on small
businesses; and the PRA, for impacts resulting from information requirements. In addition to
the RFA and the PRA, Congress also passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of
1995, requiring ex ante RIA of any proposed agency rule that may result in the expenditure
by a state, local, tribal government, or by the private sector, in the aggregate, of more than
$1 million in any one year. See Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3, at 175.
103. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 1 (2003)
[hereinafter OMB, A-4].
104. "[T]he expected benefits or accomplishments and the costs," OFFICE OF MGMT.
BUDGET, supra note 93, at 2 (emphasis added); "an estimate ... of the new reporting burdens
or recordkeeping requirements," Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 2(d)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978)
(emphasis added); "an estimateof the number of small entities to which the proposed rule will
apply," and "the projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements," 5
U.S.C. § 603(b)(3)-(4) (2012) (emphasis added); "estimateof the burden that shall result from
the collection of information" and "a description of the likely respondents and proposed
frequency of response to the collection of information," 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(D)(ii)(V)-(IV)
(2012) (emphasis added); "[a] description of the potential benefits [and costs] of the rule ...
and the identification of those likely to receive the benefits [and bear the costs," Exec. Order
No. 12,291, § 3(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981) (emphasis added); "assessment of the potential
costs and benefits of the regulatory action" and "[an assessment ...
of benefits [and costs]
anticipated from the regulatory action." Exec. Order No. 12,866, § (6)(a)(3)(B)(ii), -(C)(i),
3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993) (emphasis added); and "to quantify anticipated present and future
benefits and costs." Exec. Order No. 13,563, § (1)(c), 3 C.F.R. § 13,563 (2011) (emphasis
added).
105. OMB, A-4, supra note 103.
106. Id. Some key examples are stipulating and measuring the baseline ("what the world
would be like if the proposed rule is not adopted") and dealing with uncertainty (with
emphasis on identifying key uncertainties and conducting sensitivity analysis, as a way of
anticipating the effect of changing forecasting assumptions). Id. at 2. In one section, Circular
A-4 stipulates: "[y]our estimates cannot be more precise than their most uncertain
component. Thus, your analysis should report estimates in a way that reflects the degree of
uncertainty and not create a false sense of precision." Id. at 40.
107. See Russell S. Sobel & John A. Dove, Analyzing the Effectiveness of State Regulatory
Review, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 446 (2016); JASON A. SCHWARTZ, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH
REGULATORY REVIEW 87 (2010) (with a detailed view of each state, finding that "45 states
require[d] some form of [ex ante] economic impact analysis, besides specialized reviews like
regulatory flexibility analysis."); see also Stuart Shapiro & Deborah Borie-Holtz, Regulatory
Reform in the States: Lessons from New Jersey, (March 24, 2011) (available at
http://papers.ssrn.comlabstract-1794172). In another 2011 study, Shapiro and Borie-Holtz
classified the states of New York, Virginia, Michigan, and Pennsylvania with a maximum
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Internationally, ex ante RIA became the cornerstone of the
Better Regulation movement in Europe, and was adopted by every
OECD member country.1 08 The United Kingdom (U.K.) and the
EU represent two jurisdictions in which ex ante RIA has been
making significant advances, leading to innovative institutional
transformations in recent years. 109 In the latest version of its
guidelines, the U.K. RIA system mentions the use of sensitivity
analysis, while also discussing how to report the uncertainty of
parameters assessed in RIA.110 In 2015, the European Commission
also issued a new set of guidelines for its IA system, with similar
language and provisions revealing the forecasting basis of IA."'
D. Risk Assessment
Alongside or within CBA, EIA, and RIA, ex ante risk assessment
(RA) has been a key analytical tool for foreseeing future potential
harms of pollutants and other stressors.11 2 EPA has employed
score of stringency of RIA requirements. STUART SHAPIRO & DEBORAH BORIE-HOLTz,
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, DOES PROCESS MATTER: REGULATORY PROCEDURE AND

REGULATORY OUTPUT IN THE STATES 8 n.13 (2011), http://policyintegrity.org/publications/
detail/does-process-matter; NAVL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REVISED
MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 305 (2010) (suggesting implementation

comparison of alternatives on the basis of CBA of a proposed rule, and a determination that
the benefits of the proposed rule justify its costs).
108. Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 447
(2006); Wiener, supra note 11, at 126-28. OECD has been a major supplier of information and
experiences on regulatory quality improvement, helping to spread RIA. Id. at 130. See also
FABRIZIO DE FRANCESCO, TRANSNATIONAL POLICY INNOVATION: THE OECD AND THE
DIFFUSION OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (Dario Castiglione et al. eds., 2013)

(documenting the influence of OECD on the diffusion of RIA); OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supra
note 39.
109. For recent developments in the U.K and EU systems, respectively, see DEP'T FOR
BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, BET'ER REGULATION FRAMEWORK MANUAL (2015), and EUR.

COMM'N, Better Regulation Guidelines, COM (2015) 215 final (April 19, 2015) [hereinafter EC,
Better Regulation Guidelines].
110. DEP'T FOR BUS. ENERGY & INDUS. STRATEGY, BETTER REGULATION FRAMEWORK

MANUAL § 2.2.5 (2015). The Manual is also explicit when discussing the estimate levels and
underlying uncertainty of compliance with the proposed regulation. Id. at § 2.3.50. It has a
specific topic for "Key assumptions, sensitivities and risks" in which the foresight nature of
RIA becomes evident: "[iun order to reflect the inherent uncertainty of costs and benefits
estimates, you may need to provide a range for your costs and benefits estimates. Highlight
the factors determining the outcome within any range and how any risks will be mitigated."
Id. The Better Regulation Framework Manual refers to the Green Book as the main source of
detailed methodological guidelines. Id. at § 1.5.5.
111. EC, Better Regulation Guidelines, supra note 109 (mentioning "assumptions,"
"uncertainty," "estimates," and "sensitivity" in many parts of the document). For example:
"When quantifying [all relevant impacts], spurious precision should be avoided and ranges
provided .... Whenever an assumption is particularly important or uncertain, sensitivity
analysis should be used to check whether changing it would lead to significantly different
results." Id. at 27.
112. See Alon Rosenthal, George M. Gray & John D. Graham, Legislating Acceptable
Cancer Risk from Exposure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 Ecology L.Q. 269 (1992) (documenting
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formal RA practices since its early days, having issued its first
RA document at least as early as 1975.113 The National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) encouraged federal agencies to conduct RAs
and outlined guidelines for best practices. 114 In some. cases,
environmental statutes incorporate RA as a requirement for
agency decision or rulemaking-either
independently or
combined with EIA, RIA, and CBA.115 The Clean Air Act (CAA),
for instance, requires EPA to make findings that a pollutant
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare" for setting national ambient air quality standards, and
to conduct residual RAs after setting emissions standards for
major sources of hazardous air pollutants;1 1 3 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) mandates that EPA
make findings of endangerment to public health or the environment
to regulate hazardous waste sites;1 17 the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) stipulates a risk/
benefit analysis for the registration of pesticides.1 18 Many
other environmental statutes impose criteria or standards without
formally requiring (but in practice leading to) RA processes.1 19
Forecasting is at the center of RA, because RA attempts
to characterize the likelihood and severity of future adverse
events with the purpose of informing decisions marked by

requirements for RA in many environmental laws); RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENvT'L L. & PoL'Y 51
(3d ed. 2015) ("Risk assessment is generally recognized as the first step in the regulatory
process-a regulatory agency must first analyze the magnitude of an environmental risk
before it can intelligently decide on whether and how much risk should be regulated-a
process known as risk management").
113. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/100/B-04/001, AN EXAMINATION OF EPA, RISK
ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 4 (2004) [hereinafter EPA, 2004 EXAMINATION]; see also
CARNEGIE COMMN ON SCl., TECH., & GOV'T, RISK AND THE ENV'T 27 (1993).
114. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS 57-58 (1983); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS:
ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT 26 (2009); see also Junius C. McElveen, Jr., Risk Assessment

in the Federal Government: Trying to Understand the Process, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 53
(1991); EPA, 2004 EXAMINATION, supra note 113, at 3 (describing the use of risk assessment
as a routine activity by EPA for making multiple kinds of decisions).
115. RA of pollutants or other stressors should, in principle, provide the information for
the harm estimates in EIA and for the risk reduction benefits estimates in RIA. See Alan L.
Porter & Frederick A. Rossini, Integrated Impact Assessment, 6 INTERDISC. Sci. REV. 346
(1981); Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, CostBenefit Analysis, and JudicialReview, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 89, 93 (2000); Hossein
Mahmoudi et al., A framework for combining social impact assessment and risk assessment,
43 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESS. REV. 1 (2013).

116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a)(1)(A), 7412(f)(1) (2012); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA-453/R- 99-001, RESIDUAL RISK REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999).
117. McElveen, supra note 114, at 48 n.3.
118. See GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-52, EPA'S USE OF BENEFIT
ASSESSMENTS IN REGULATING PESTICIDES 9 (1991).

119. Rosenthal et al., supra note 112; McElveen, supra note 114.
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uncertainty.120 The NAS's National Research Council has
acknowledged that risk assessors rely on assumptions and make
use of "inferential bridges" in order to conduct ex ante RA in the
face of uncertainty. 12 1 The analytical steps of RA (hazard
identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment,
and risk characterization) are necessarily inferential, resulting in
estimates with ranges of uncertainty. 122
III. FROM FORESIGHT TO HINDSIGHT:
THE RISE OF RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
The development of prospective analytical tools for policy
foresight-such as ex ante RA, CBA, EIA, and RIA-has enabled
important advances in protection of public health, environment
and security against uncertain future risks, but it has also prompted
the question whether these ex ante tools are generating accurate
foresight. There is growing interest in developing evidence-based
tools to enable retrospective, ex post, or look-back reviews of,
past policies. 123 The precautionary approach underlying ex ante
IA tools ("look before you leap") also suggests the value of revisiting
earlier estimates in light of data on actual experience: prudent
precaution is provisional, to be revised as knowledge improves. 124
Different forms of retrospective, ex post, and periodic reviews
have gained ground in the literature and have gradually been
adopted by governments, supplementing ex ante RA, CBA, EIA,
and RIA tools. This Section describes these developments. A key
finding of our inquiry is that retrospective reviews have more
120. For a historical account of the evolution of risk analysis from probability theory, see
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1996). On deep

uncertainty in RA, see Robert J. Lempert & Myles T. Collins, Managing the Risk of Uncertain
Threshold Responses: Comparison of Robust, Optimum, and PrecautionaryApproaches, 27
RISK ANALYSIS 1009 (2007). On RA and management of extreme catastrophic risks, see Nick
Bostrom, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority, 4 GLOB. POLY 15 (2013); Jonathan
B. Wiener, The Tragedy of the Uncommons: On the Politics of Apocalypse, 7 GLOB. POL'Y 67
(2016).
121. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra

note 114, at 3, 28. By contrast, RIA fits into the NRC's definition of risk management: "the
process of weighing policy alternatives and selecting the most appropriate regulatory action,
integrating the results of risk assessment with engineering data and with social, economic,
and political concerns to reach a decision." Id. at 3; see also Anderson et al., supra note 115,
at 91. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra
note 114, at 7 (stressing the importance of communicating uncertainty and variability in the
results of RA).
122. See M. Granger Morgan, Risk Analysis and Management, 269 SC. AM. 32, 34 (1993)
(explaining the different uncertainties inherent to risk analysis and, consequently, the need
to represent them with probability distributions).
123. See ALDY, supra note 22; Coglianese, supra note 42.
124. See Wiener, supra note 2.
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often been aimed at reducing the cost of individual rules, and
less often at learning from experience to improve the accuracy of
ex ante foresight.
A. Ex Post RL4 in the U.S.
Ex ante analysis of regulatory impacts of proposed rules, and ex
post evaluation of existing rules, developed as intertwined ideas
since the early years of RIA in the U.S.125 While addressing
Congress in 1974, President Ford asked Congress to "undertake
a long-overdue total reexamination of the independent regulatory
agencies" as part of a joint effort to "identify and eliminate existing
federal rules and regulations that increase costs to the consumer
without any good reason in today's economic climate." 126 But
soon after, when he issued EO 11,821, Ford's Inflation Impact
Statement (IIS) focused only on proposals for legislation or
promulgation of new regulations and rules by executive agencies.1 27
In 1978, President Carter's EO 12,044 not only expanded the ex
ante RIA requirement to address all economic impacts, but also
innovated significantly by introducing ex post RIA. 128 Carter's EO
had a specific section on "Review of Existing Regulations," requiring
agencies to "periodically review their existing regulations to
determine whether they are achieving the policy goals of this
Order."1 29 In addition to this central mandate, EO 12,044 also
stipulated procedural/methodological rules, as well as selection
criteria, communication and participation requirements of such
regulatory reviews. 130 Methodologically, regulatory reviews should
"follow the same procedural steps outlined for the development of

125. Nixon's QLR, however, focused only on the estimated impacts of new regulation,
given its predominant focus-the recent new wave of environmental regulation. OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 93, at 1.
126. Gerald Ford, "WHI-P INFLATION NoW" SPEECH (OCTOBER 8, 1974), MILLER CENTER,

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (Oct. 8, 1974), http://milercenter.org/president/ford/speeches/
speech-3283 (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
127. See OMB, A-4, supra note 103. Exec. Order No. 11,821, Preamble, 39 Fed. Reg.
41,501 (1974). The Council on Wage and Price Stability, created in 1974 by Congress, to which
EO 11,821 allowed OMB to delegate its oversight functions related to the IIS, employed broad
language to describe its role, which could potentially include reviewing the performance of
existing programs and activities. Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387,
§ 3(A)(7), 88 Stat. 750, 750 (1974).
128. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
129. Id. at § 4. The goals of the EO are stipulated in section 1, according to which
"[R]egulations shall be as simple and clear as possible. They shall achieve legislative goals
effectively and efficiently. They shall not impose unnecessary burdens on the economy, on
individuals, on public or private organizations, or on State and local governments." Id. at § 1.
130. Id. at § 4.
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new regulations,"1 3 1 i.e., ex ante regulatory analysis.1 32 The criteria
developed by each agency for selecting rules for review-based on
the general criteria stipulated by the EO-and the list of regulations
selected for review were to be published and included in the
semiannual agency agendas.1 33 EO 12,044 also required that new
regulations include "a plan for evaluating the regulation after
its issuance has been developed"134-a prospective provision for
retrospective review.
After Carter's EO, every other EO issued on RIA included a
provision regarding retrospective reviews of existing regulation,
although typically with a less comprehensive framework than in
EO 12,044. For example, section 3 of EO 12,291, issued by President
Reagan in 1981, included a subsection requiring agencies to "initiate
reviews of currently effective rules in accordance with the purposes
of this Order, and perform Regulatory Impact Analyses of currently
effective major rules."13 5 The provision requiring agencies to include
in ex ante RIA a plan for future review disappeared, as well as
mentions of selection criteria for review.1 36 On the other hand,
OMB was given express authority to designate currently effective
rules for review and establish schedules for reviews and analyses
under the EO.1 3 7 Then, in 1993 with EO 12,866, President Clinton
included section 5 on ex post evaluation of existing regulations,
requiring publication of regulations selected for review in each
agency's annual plan and regulatory agenda, empowering the Vice
President to identify rules for review, and instructing agencies
to conduct reviews to make existing rules "more effective in
131. Id.
132. Including, in the case of significant regulations with major consequences, "a careful
examination of alternative approaches" and a "succinct statement of the problem; a
description of the major alternative ways of dealing with the problem that were considered
by the agency; an analysis of the economic consequences of each of these alternatives and a
detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one alternative over the others." Id. at §
3(b)(1).
133. Id. at § 2(a).
134. Id. at § 2(d)(8).
135. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(i), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
136. See id.
137. In 1985, President Reagan issued EO 12,498, once again addressing the need to
reduce the burdens of "existing and future regulations." It created a requirement that
agencies should annually state their regulatory policies, goals, and objectives for the coming
years, including "information concerning all significant regulatory actions underway or
planned." Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985). In 1992, President
Bush announced in his State of the Union Address a 90-day moratorium on new regulation,
and a review of federal regulations, which was then directed to agencies via a memorandum
on the same day. The memorandum defines the standards for review, mirroring much of the
process applicable to ex ante RIA under EO 12,291. Neil R. Eisner et al., Federal Agency
Reviews ofExisting Regulations,48 ADMIN. L. REV. (AM. BAR Ass'N) 139, 142 (1996). President
Clinton followed the same approach and mandated another one-time review effort of existing
regulations via memorandum issued to federal agencies in 1995. Hahn, supra note 76, at 887.
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achieving the regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater
alignment with the President's priorities."1 3 8
President Obama supplemented EO 12,866 with three
additional EOs, all with rules for retrospective review of
existing regulations.1 39 Like EO 12,866, EO 13,563 dedicates
one section to what it calls "Retrospective Analysis of
Existing Rules."1 4 0 By reaffirming the provision in section 5 of
EO 12,866, President Obama signaled that at least some agencies
had not complied with it so far, requiring them again to submit to
OIRA "a preliminary plan . . . under which the agency will

periodically review its existing regulations
."141
In the
following year, President Obama issued EO 13,610, on "Identifying
and Reducing Regulatory Burdens."1 42 This new EO added to
the ex post RIA system a provision on public participation, and
created a complementary duty requiring agencies to report
semiannually to OIRA "on the status of their retrospective review
efforts,"1 43 describing "progress, anticipated accomplishments,
and proposed timelines for relevant actions . . . ."1" EO 13,610

also stipulated in section 3 a set of factors that agencies
should consider when setting priorities and selecting rules for
review.145 OIRA has issued a series of memoranda pressing
138. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 5(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sep. 30, 1993). The goal of such
review is defined in the same provision as "to determine whether any such regulations should
be modified or eliminated so as to make the agency's regulatory program more effective in
achieving the regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater alignment with the
President's priorities and the principles set forth in this Executive Order."
139. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,579,
76 Fed. Reg. 41,585 (Jul. 11, 2011); Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 10
2012).
140. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
141. Id. at § 6(b). The provision announces the same goal of the review "to determine
whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as
to make the agency's regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the
regulatory objectives." Id. The other operational provision in section 6-this one originaldirects agencies to release "[s]uch retrospective analyses, including supporting data,...
online whenever possible." Id. at § 6(a).
142. Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,469 (May 10, 2012). EO 13,610 renames
"review of existing regulations" as "retrospective review." The same overall purpose is
reaffirmed: "to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether they
remain justified and whether they should be modified or streamlined in light of changed
circumstances, including the rise of new technologies." Id. at § 1.
143. Id. at §§ 3-4.
144. Id. at §§ 2, 4. EO 13,610 also requires that such semiannual reports be made
available to the public, as well as the "retrospective analyses of regulations, including
supporting data"-the latter, "wherever practicable." Id.
145. The factors are: (a) reviews that will "produce significant quantifiable monetary
savings or significant quantifiable reductions in paperwork burdens while protecting public
health, welfare, safety, and our environment;" (b) reviews that wil "reduce unjustified
regulatory burdens or simplify or harmonize regulatory requirements imposed on small
business;" (c) reforms that would make "significant progress in reducing those burdens while
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the agencies to identify existing rules and conduct reviews, but
OIRA has not yet issued a full guideline document for ex post
RIA akin to Circular A-4 for ex ante RIA. 146
In addition to presidents using their executive powers to
promote ex post RIA in the U.S., Congress has also created statutory
ex post evaluation requirements. For example, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) provisions on periodic regulatory review
require that every regulation with a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities must undergo a review
within ten years of being issued. 147 The Paperwork Reduction
Act (PRA) allowed any interested party to request that OMB review
an existing information collection requirement, which could lead
to a "remedial" action by OMB and the agency.148 Also, the PRA
called for new regulations to have their information collection
requirements reviewed every three years after initial approval;
based on the review report, OMB can approve or disapprove the
extension. 149 The Unfunded Mandates Act (UMRA) also has a
provision regarding review of existing regulations, although with-a
provisional nature.1 5 0 Several specific laws also require periodic
reviews of past policies: examples include the five year reviews of
national ambient air quality standards in the CAA, and the six year
reviews of drinking water quality standards in the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA). 151
protecting public health, welfare, safety, and our environment;" and (d) "consideration to the
cumulative effects of agency regulations, including cumulative burdens." Id. at § 3.
146. Coglianese, supra note 42, at 61-62; see also Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis
and Administrative Law, 2002 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 62 (2002).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 610(a) ("[t]he purpose of the review shall be to determine whether such
rules should be continued without change, or should be amended or rescinded, consistent with
the stated objectives of applicable statutes, to minimize any significant economic impact of
the rules upon a substantial number of such small entities.").
148. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3507(g)-(h)(1) (2000).
149. Id.
150. Title III of the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 (UMRA) addresses "Review of
Federal Mandates," granting the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
powers to investigate and review the role and impact of existing Federal mandates. As a result
of such review-which appears in the Act to be a one-time analysis-the Commission may
make a recommendation for "suspending, on a temporary basis, Federal mandates which are
not vital to public health and safety and which compound the fiscal difficulties of State, local,
and tribal governments, including recommendations for triggering such suspension." 2 U.S.C.
§ 1552(a)(3)(d) (1995).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (Clean Air Act provision for NAAQS to be reviewed every five
years); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(9) (1996) (SDWA provision for six year reviews). The Frank R.
Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act of 2016, amending the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., now calls for periodic reviews of policies every
five years. Pub. L. 114-182 (June 22, 2016), amending TSCA to insert section 26(1), to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2625(1). The Telecommunications Act of 1996 calls for biennial reviews
by the Federal Communications Commission. Robert Hahn et al., Assessing the Quality of
RegulatoryImpact Analyses, 23 HARV. J. OF LAW & PUB. POL'Y 889 (2000).
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At least since 1996, Congress began to include in appropriations
legislation a requirement directing OMB to annually submit
reports containing "estimates of the total annual costs and benefits
of Federal Regulatory programs, including quantitative and
non-quantitative measures of regulatory costs and benefits." 52
Initially, the requirement also stipulated that OMB should
include in its report "recommendations from the Director .

.

. to

reform or eliminate any Federal regulatory program or program
element that is inefficient, ineffective, or is not a sound use of the
Nations' resources." 153 The provisions were annually renewed in
appropriations legislation until, in 2001, it became a permanent
feature of what is now known as the Regulatory Right-to-Know
Act. 154 In 2012, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, which also requires OMB to include in its annual report
to Congress information on agency implementation of EO 13,563;
in particular, it requires OMB to identify "existing regulations that
have been reviewed and determined to be outmoded, ineffective,
and excessively burdensome." 15 5
Following the same pattern of diffusion of ex ante RIA, U.S.
states have also adopted requirements for periodic ex post reviews
of existing regulations. 1 6 The 1981 edition of the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA) suggests a provision
requiring periodic review of all agency regulations in no longer than
seven years.15 7 In 2000, Robert Hahn reported that nearly one-third
152. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997) [hereinafter OIRA, 1997 REPORT].

153. Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 1997, §
645, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008)).
154. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, § 625, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of
2001, § 624, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 115 Stat. 514 (2001) ("[flor the calendar year 2002 and each
year thereafter.."). Starting in 1999, the language used in the two provisions changed:
regarding the recommendations for reform, the new statute directed OMB to only include in
its report "recommendations for reform." Id.; Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-227, §§ 683(a)(1)-(3), 112 Stat. 2681
(1999) (requiring that in the accounting statement and associated report submitted by OIRA
there should be "recommendations for reform."). Section 638(a)(1) became "an estimate of the
total annual costs and benefits (including quantifiable and non-quantifiable effects) of Federal
rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible: (A) in the aggregate; (B) by agency and agency
program; and (C) by major rule." Id.
155. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786; OFFICE OF
INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES

*

56 (2013) [hereinafter OIRA, 2012 REPORT].
156. See SCHWARTZ, supranote 107, at 46; Hahn, supra note 76. See infra Section IV.
157. Interestingly, the 2010 edition does not have the same provision. The 1981 version
was substituted for another rule creating the possibility of periodic review of agency
regulations by a legislative committee. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS, supra note 107; SCHWARTZ, supra note 107, at 34, 37, 115.
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of the states had adopted comprehensive review requirements of all
existing regulations. 15 8 The extensive analysis conducted in 2010 by
Jason Schwartz of the Institute for Policy Integrity found thirty
states in which agencies were either encouraged or required to
reevaluate their existing regulations periodically.1 59 The trigger for
review in these systems is the passage of time from the initial date
of when an agency issues a regulation, with the selection of rules to
review including, in many states, all regulations.16 0
B. Ex Post RIA Beyond the U.S.
As with ex ante RIA, ex post RIA has also become a global
element of regulatory governance. In 2012 OECD published a new
set of recommendations from its Council on Regulatory Policy and
Governance.16 1 Along with recommending adoption of ex ante RIA,
it called for member countries to "[clonduct systematic programme
reviews of the stock of significant regulation against clear defined
policy goals, including consideration of costs and benefits, to ensure
that regulations remain up to date, cost justified, cost effective and
consistent, and deliver the intended policy objectives."1 6 2 It directed
countries to do this by "[m]aintain[ing] a regulatory management
system, including both ex ante assessment and ex post evaluation
16 3
as key parts of evidence-based decision making."
158. Hahn, supra note 76, at 874, 876 (the study relied on interviews and survey data,
sometimes with only one response per state).
159. SCHWARTZ, supra note 107, at 86. Another study, published in 2016, found twentyfive states that enacted requirements to review existing regulations, from 2006 through 2013.
See Stuart Shapiro, Debra Borie-Holtz & Ian Markey, Retrospective Review in Four States, 39
REG. 32 (2016) (narrating the recent history and reporting interview data on the adoption and
implementation of review of existing regulations in four states: Delaware, Nevada, Florida,
and Rhode Island).
160. SCHWARTZ, supra note 107, at 115-123.
161. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 2012 OECD RECOMMENDATION OF THE
COUNCIL ON REGULATORY POLICY GOVERNANCE 3 (2012) [hereinafter OECD, 2012

RECOMMENDATION] (building upon the 1997 OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, the 2005
Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance, the 2005 APEC-OECD
Integrated Checklist for Regulatory Reform, and the 2009 Recommendation of the Council on
Competition Assessment).
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 6. OECD also said that "[tihe use of a permanent review mechanism should
be considered for inclusion in rules, such as through review clauses in primary laws and
sunsetting of subordinate legislation." Id. at 12. The 2012 Recommendation builds on the
1995 Recommendation, in which no mention to ex post RIA existed. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF

GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1995). It also supplements the 2005 OECD Guiding Principles
for Regulatory Quality and Performance, which already suggested that member countries
"[a]ssess impacts and review regulations systematically to ensure that they meet their
intended objectives efficiently and effectively in a changing and complex economic and social
environment ..... ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., OECD GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
REGULATORY QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE 14 (2005). Synthesizing 10 years of work on
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OECD reported that by 2011, twenty-four of its member
countries had mandatory periodic evaluation requirements of
existing regulations.1 64 Of the jurisdictions that have adopted ex
post RIA, three systems have a distinct level of sophistication and
detail: the U.K., the EU, and Australia.16 5
1. United Kingdom
Initially influenced by the U.S. RIA system, the U.K. IA
system eventually outpaced its American archetype in its ex
post IA framework.16 6 From the initial phase of development in
the mid-1980s, the U.K. IA system followed a dual approach,
targeting both the flow of new regulations and the stock of
existing regulations.1 67 To address the first, the central government
6 8 The CCA
developed the Compliance Cost Assessment (CCA).s
was later transformed into the U.K. RIA with the launch of
the Better Regulation Initiative in 1998, and rebranded in 2007
as simply "Impact Assessment."1 6 9 On the side of existing
regulatory reform, OECD published in 2011 a report identifying ex post evaluation as one of
the essential tools of regulatory policy alongside ex ante RIA. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE: SUPPORTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2011) [hereinafter OECD, SUPPORTING ECONOMIC GROWTH].
164. OECD, SUPPORTING ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 163, at 31. In 2015, OECD

reported that the number was 20 countries plus the European Commission see OECD, POLICY
OUTLOOK, supra note 39; see infra Section III, for observations about the methodology of the
study.
165. See infra Section m.
166. HOUSE OF COMMONS, LIFTING THE BURDEN, 1985, Cmnd. 9571, at 2-3 (UK)
[hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS, LIFTING THE BURDEN] ("[wie have considered carefully the

work done in other countries, in particular in the U.S.A."). Comparisons with the U.S.
regulatory policy appeared in the other reports of the time, such as in a 1986 White Paper:
The secret of the American experience undoubtedly lies in a more entrepreneurial
society. Yet that is not all. If we examine their economy we will see that individuals
are far less restricted if they wish to work for themselves, to start a new business,
or to employ people. They enjoy a freedom from regulations foreign to most
Europeans. Are they too free, or are we too regulated?
HOUSE OF COMMONS, BUILDING BUSINESSES ... NOT BARRIERS, 1986, Cmnd. 9794, at 1 (UK)
[hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS, BUILDING BUSINESSES].
167. HOUSE OF COMMONS, LIFTING THE BURDEN, supra note 166, at 3.

168. Since the inception of CCA, it had some requirements aimed at enabling a future
review of a new proposed regulation to which the CCA applied. See HOUSE OF COMMONS,
BUILDING BUSINESSES, supra note 166, at 12 (stipulating as one of elements of the CCA the
clarification of "what steps can be taken to measure the effectiveness of the new regulation in
meeting its objectives?"). This was accompanied by a prescription regarding (partial)
monitoring, directing departments to "keep adequate records of the effects of regulationsold as well as new-on business." Id. at 72. The necessary integration between ex ante and
ex post IA was consolidated in further guidance documents. See UK HOUSE OF LORDS, THE
MANAGEMENT OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION, 2006, HL 149-1, at 13 (UK) (proposing a policy

cycle approach to integrated ex ante and ex post IA, and mentioning that officials should "use
[ex ante] Impact Assessment of the starting point for the [post-implementation] review").
169. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS:
ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF REVIEW BY GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 7 (2009).
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regulations, reform initiatives evolved from ad hoc to a sophisticated
program of evaluation and reform with two distinct components.
One aimed at reviewing the stock of existing regulations, often
organized by sectors of policy themes, with the purpose of reducing
compliance costs by repealing or improving rules (leading to the
creation of an ongoing program called Cutting Red Tape). 170
The second component of reviewing rules included planned ex
post evaluations-known as post-implementation reviews (PIR). 171
PIRs would take place after a period of implementation of new
proposed regulations in order to measure their performance against
goals and decision criteria stipulated in ex ante lAs.1 72 After
2011, every regulation imposing regulatory burdens on businesses
or civil society had to contain either a sunset or a review clauseboth triggering a PIR.1 73 The government has published detailed
guidelines covering the method PIRs must follow.

17 4

There is also ex post evaluation of primary legislation in
the U.K.-called post-legislative scrutiny (PLS).1 75 In 2001, the
Regulatory Reform Act passed by Parliament required legislative
proposals to include a description of the "burdens which the
existing law ... has the effect of imposing."17 6 In 2004, the House of

170. HOUSE OF COMMONS, LIFTING THE BURDEN, supra note 166, at 1; ROLF G. ALTER ET
AL., FROM RED TAPE TO SMART TAPE: ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION IN OECD COUNTRIES
197 (2003); HOUSE OF COMMONS, BUILDING BUSINESSES, supra note 166, at 4; HOUSE OF
COMMONS, RELEASING ENTERPRISE, 1988, Cm. 512, AT 1 (UK). Starting in 1988, the

government committed to adopting a more systematic review of the stock of existing
regulations, which would take place as a rolling annual program. Id. at 1; see HM GOv'T,
REDUCING REGULATION MADE SIMPLE 13 (2010) (UK) (mentioning the adopting of thematic
reviews); NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, DELIVERING REGULATORY REFORM 29 (2011) (UK) (chronicling

the creation of the first online platform for ongoing review of existing rules based on public
input-initially called "Your Freedom").
171. See ALTER ET AL., supra note 170.
172. Since at least 2003, the RIA guidelines mention the policy cycle approach and
underscore necessary links between ex ante and ex post RIA (such as the importance of
monitoring and the feedback of the resulting data into the "policy making process").
REGULATORY IMPACT UNIT, BETTER POLICY MAKING: A GUIDE TO REGULATORY IMPACT

ASSESSMENT 29 (2003). These developments led OECD to consider the U.K in the same year
a "primary example of the increasing international emphasis on regulatory quality." ALTER
ET AL., supra note 170, at 196.
173. BETTER REGULATION TASK FORCE, REGULATION - LESS IS MORE 7 (2005). HM GOv'T,

supra note 170, at 11. In 2015, PIR gained statutory basis with the Small Business,
Enterprise, and Employment Act 2015, c. 26.
174. The guidelines are stipulated in the Magenta Book, which is applicable to
evaluation of other policy decisions and programs. HM TREASURY, THE MAGENTA BOOK
GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION 11 (2011).
175. U.K. DEP'T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, CLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN POLICY EVALUATION, POST-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY AND PoST-IMPLEMENTATION

REVIEW (2010).
176. Regulatory Reform Act 2001, ch. 6 § (2)(a). Periodic review of existing and future
reviews of new legislation were considered in the U.K. since the early 1990s. HOUSE OF LORDS,
PARLIAMENT & THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, Report, 2003-4, HL 173, at 8 (UK) (also
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Lords published a report acknowledging its co-responsibility in
making sure legislation was "fit for purpose." 77 For achieving
this goal, it proposed the adoption of PLS, which would be triggered
after no longer than six years of implementation, by a review
clause included in every piece of legislation. 7 8 The same policy
cycle approach that influenced the design of PIR also inspired the
framing of PLS by Parliament, which saw PLS as a complementary
tool to pre-legislative scrutiny, and pre-legislative scrutiny as a
facilitator of PLS. 79 Based on current guidelines, after three to
five years after enactment of an Act of Parliament, the department
responsible for implementation must submit a memorandum with
the results of a preliminary ex post assessment of its performance.18 0
Based on this report, a committee from Parliament decides whether
to conduct a full PLS.8 1
2. European Union
Since its early years, the EU RIA program also reflected a
concern for measuring the performance of existing regulations.1 82 Ex
ante IA evolved in the European Commission from the Business
Impact Assessment adopted in 1986 under the U.K. Presidency and
modeled after the U.K. CCA. 183 During the 1990s, the Commission
added new tools aimed at implementing ex post assessment of
existing regulation.1 84 When IA took its shape in the EU during the
early 2000s, it implicitly (and, later, explicitly) followed the policy
cycle model, with continual learning via integration of ex ante and
ex post IA. 8 5 One decisive step in this direction coincided with the
highlighting the integration between ex ante and ex post IA, with PLS being able to work as
a means of assessing the utility of pre-legislative scrutiny). Id. at 43.
177. HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 176, at 8 (also highlighting the integration between
ex ante and ex post IA, with PLS being able to work as "a means of assessing the utility of
pre-legislative scrutiny). Id. at 43.
178. Id. at 27, 44.
179. LAW COMM'N, PosT-LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY, 2006, Cm. 6945, at 9 (UK).
180. U.K CABINET OFFICE, GUIDE TO MAKING LEGISLATION 288 (2015).

181. Id. at 263.
182. See ANDREA RENDA, IwACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EU: THE STATE OF THE ART AND
THE ART OF THE STATE 45 (2006).

183. Id. at 45-48. The influence of U.S. RIA was also a factor propelling the Better
Regulation movement in the EU. See Wiener, supra note 108, at 451.
184. Such as the SLIM project (Simplification of the Legislation on the Internal Market),
the creation of the BEST (Business Environment Simplification Task Force), in 1997; and the
creation of the Business Test Panel in 1998, with the aim of acting as a permanent body for
consultation of firms affected by EU regulations. ANDREA RENDA, LAw AND ECONOMICS IN
THE RIA WORLD: IMPROVING THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN PUBLIC POLICY AND

LEGISLATION 51 (2011).
185. EUR. COMM'N, Focus on Results: Strengthening Evaluation of Commission
Activities, at 7, SEC (2000) 1051 final (July 26, 2000) (conveying what would later be
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2010 rebranding of the Better Regulation agenda to "Smart
Regulation."18 6 Along with the explicit adoption of the policy
cycle approach, the Commission announced in the document an
increased emphasis on ex post evaluation.18 7 The Commission,
implementing the new vision, followed the same strategy as adopted
in the U.K., of two distinct programs of reviews of existing
regulations.18 8 The first focused on the flow of new rules by requiring
a review or sunset clause in every new proposed regulation,
based on which ex post RIA must take place after a period of
implementation (planned ex post evaluation); the second created a
program of review of the stock of existing regulation.189
Going beyond the U.K. model, the EU added two new features
to its RIA system. For the flow of new regulations (or regulatory
amendments), the EU added a requirement called the "evaluate
first principle," which links the new rule to a prior ex post RIA
of the existing rule being revised. " For the stock of existing rules,
the Commission created the Regulatory Fitness and Performance
Program (REFIT), which included two types of review: evaluation

consolidated and made mandatory as the "evaluate first principle" and mentioning that "[a]s
a rule, the preparation of proposals with budgetary and resource implications should include
information on: ... lessons learned from any past intervention... ; plan for monitoring and
evaluation during the course of the intervention"). In 2012, with the REFIT Program: "the
evaluation process could be designed alongside the policy itself with better monitoring and
reporting." EUR. COMM'N, EU Regulatory Fitness, at 7, COM (2012) 746 final (Dec. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter EC, EU RegulatoryFitness].
186. EC, Smart Regulation, supra note 22.
187. Id. In this key white paper, the Commission said: "[s]mart regulation policy will
therefore attach greater importance than before to evaluating the functioning and
effectiveness of existing legislation." Id. at 3.
188. See EC, Better Regulation Guidelines, supra note 109, at 30, 37; see also supra notes
176 and 177.
189. See id. ("[1legislative proposals should also foresee when, how and on what basis
legislation will be evaluated in the future"); EUR. COMM'N, BETTER REGULATION TOOLBoX 260
(2015) [hereinafter EC, BETTER REGULATION TOOLBOX]. The requirement is less stringent
than in the U.K. system, where ex post RIA should take place in no longer than five years of
implementation. In contrast, Directorate-Generals (DG) have discretion in the EU to stipulate
when ex post RIA will take place. DEP'T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, supra note 109, at
31, 33. EC, BETTER REGULATION TOOLBOx 260. The decision about when to conduct an
evaluation must be made at the time of the proposal, Le., early in the policy cycle: "[liegislative
proposals should also foresee when, how and on what basis legislation will be evaluated in
the future." By not specifying limits and guidance to this decision, the guidelines give
discretion to each DG to define when ex post RIA should take place. The guidelines also
mention the use of sunset clauses as a possibility ("may be used"). EC, Better Regulation
Guidelines, supra note 109, at 37.
190. Also differently from the U.K, the EU system describes not only the methodological
details of evaluations, but also the procedure that must be followed. See EC, Smart
Regulation, supra note 22, at 6; EC, Better Regulation Guidelines, supranote 109, at VI. There
is a specific guideline document covering the prescribed methods for evaluations. EUR.
COMM'N, EVALSED SOURCEBOOIC METHOD AND TECHNIQUES (2013).
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and cutting red tape measures.19 1 Moreover, within the category
of evaluation, it created three different species: evaluation (of
individual rules), fitness checks (of a thematic body of rules), and
cumulative cost studies (usually focusing on a specific industry
sector).1 9 2
Also in 2010, when the Commission formalized the adoption
of the REFIT Program, the European Parliament created its
Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value
(Directorate).1 9 3 The new Directorate mission was defined as
"enhanc[ing] Parliament's capacity to undertake scrutiny and
oversight of the executive, particularly through ex ante and ex
post evaluation of EU legislation."1 9 4 Now under the umbrella of
the European Parliamentary Research Service, one of the services
corresponding to units of the former Directorate is aimed at
"[e]valuating the results of existing European legislation."1 95 The
Directorate issued succinct procedural guidelines for conducting
supplemental ex ante IA, but not for ex post evaluations.19
3.

Australia

Beyond the U.S. and Europe, Australia gained the reputation
of a having a strong RIA system, considered by OECD as the
member country with "the most developed system [of ex post
evaluation] in both primary and subordinate legislation."1 9 7 Ex
ante RIA was adopted in Australia in 1985.198 Three decades later,
the Australian RIA system had evolved to adopt a multi-track

191. EC, EURegulatoryFitness, supra note 185. Within cutting red tape measures, the
REFIT Program includes two other sub-categories: studies and "legislative initiatives"-the
latter include "consolidation, simplification, recast, and codification." EC, BETTER
REGULATION TOOLBOx, supra note 189, at 33.
192. EC, EU Regulatory Fitness, supra note 185.
193. The creation of the Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value
was the Parliament's institutional solution to fulfilling its obligations under the 2003 InterInstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making signed with the Commission and the Council.
-

See EUR. PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERv., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WORK IN THE FIELDS OF EXANTE IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE: ACTIVITY REPORT FOR JUNE 2012
JUNE 2014, at 5 (2014).
194. EUR. PARLIAMENT RESEARCH SERV., IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND EUROPEAN ADDED

VALUE: DIRECTORATE C (2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eulEPRS/Welcometo-EPRSDir_C-Mar2015.pdf [hereinafter EPRS, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE]
195. European Parliament Research Service, EuR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20150201PVL00031/European-Parliamentary-Research-Service
(last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
196. See EPRS, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE, supra note 194,

at 9.
197. OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supranote 39, at 129.
198. AUSTL. PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, IDENTIFYING AND EVALUATING
REFORMS: PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION RESEARCH REPORT XII (2011).
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approach addressing both the flow of new regulation and the
stock of existing regulations. 199 One of the ten principles disciplining
the work of Australian policy makers stipulates that "[a]ll
regulation must be periodically reviewed to test its continuing
relevance." 200 For new regulations, a PIR must be completed
within a period of no longer than five years (in some cases, two
years) of rule implementation. 201 All regulatory changes with a
substantial or widespread impact on the Australian economy must
undergo a PIR within five years of implementation. 2 02 The system
also has links integrating ex ante with ex post RIA, representing
the same idea of a policy cycle: the findings from a PIR that
concludes that a regulatory change is necessary are used to inform
a decision about, and incorporated into a new ex ante RIA of,
a proposed regulatory revision. 203 In addition, an ex ante RIA
should plan and make arrangements enabling a future ex post
evaluation. 20 As to the stock of existing regulations, the Australian
system promotes "stock-takes" of regulation by either relying
on public input to select rules for review or choosing a specific
205
industry sector or theme to have all regulations evaluated.
199. The principle is stated in a 2011 report by the Australian Productivity Commission:
[t]he regulatory system should ensure that new regulation and the existing 'stock'
are appropriate, effective and efficient. This requires the robust vetting of proposed
regulation; 'fime tuning' of existing regulations and selecting key areas for reform.
... There is a range of approaches to reviewing existing regulation and identifying
necessary reforms. Some are more 'routine', making incremental improvements
through ongoing management of the stock; some involve reviews that are
programmed, and some are more ad-hoc. Designed for different purposes, the
techniques within these three categories can complement each other, through their
usefulness varies.
Id. at X; see Lorenzo Allio, Ex Post Evaluation of Regulation: An Overview of the Notion and
of InternationalPractices, in REGULATORY POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE: A READER'S COMPANION
TO THE OECD REGULATORY POLICY OUTLOOK 2015 at 191 (2015).
200. DEP'T OF THE PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT GUIDE
TO REGULATION 2 (2014).
201. OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 129.
202. OFFICE OF BEST PRACTICE REGULATION, POST-IMPLEMENTATION REVIEWS:

GUIDANCE NOTICE 2 (2016) (also mentioning that a PIR is required if a regulatory change
that is not minor nor "machinery in nature" had not been preceded by an ex ante RIA). If the
ex ante RIA prepared for a regulation is considered inadequate by the Office of Best Practice
Regulation (OBPR), a PIR must be completed within two years instead of five. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 7.
204. OFFICE OF BEST PRACTICE REGULATION, USER GUIDE TO THE AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT GUIDE TO REGULATION 7 (2016). One of the elements OBPR assesses when

overseeing ex ante RIA reports (RIS) is whether "it ha[s] a clear implementation and
evaluation plan." Id. at 11. Implementation and evaluation also correspond to the topic of one
of the seven RIS questions agencies must address in ex ante RIAs, according to the guidelines.
See DEPT. OF THE PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, supra note 200, at 5.
205. AUSTL. PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 198, at XXVIII (referring to this

approach as "Principle-based reviews strategies").
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C. Ex Post EIA, CBA, and RA
EIA systems have seen some tentative requirements for ex post
evaluation, but in a less systematized form when compared to RIA.
In the U.S., for instance, NEPA directs CEQ to "review and appraise
the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in
the light of the policy set forth in title I of this Act." 206 Still, this
duty has not been taken by CEQ as a mandate to conduct or require
ex post EIA. 2 0 7 Neither NEPA nor the CEQ guidelines require
agencies to plan and conduct a future review of ex ante EIAs in light
of new information gathered from implementing the action that
triggered it.208 Nevertheless, the topic has been adopted by the EIA
epistemic community, generating significant literature on what is
called follow-up, post-implementation audit of EIAs, and adaptive
environmental assessment and management. 209 Commentators
206. 42 U.S.C. § 204(3). Also, NEPA requires the preparation and submission to
Congress of an annual Environmental Quality Report including "a review of the programs
and activities (including regulatory activities) of the Federal Government, the State and local
governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals with particular reference to their
effect on the environment and on the conservation, development, and utilization of natural
resources; and . . . a program for remedying the deficiencies of existing programs and
activities." Id. at §§ 201(4)-(5).
207. Under EO 13,563, CEQ implemented a series of NEPA pilots, but these were not
meant to conduct or promote ex post evaluation of each EIA. Rather, the pilots were meant to
(a) review CEQ's own NEPA regulations, and (b) review the evaluation of EIAs by EPA under
Clean Air Act section 309. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY PLAN FOR RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING REGULATIONS (2011). A partial move

in the direction of ex post EIA is the requirement issued by CEQ in 2010 and 2011,
emphasizing the need for better post-decision monitoring when an agency issues a Finding of
No Significant Impact (FONSI) and periodic reviews of categorical exclusions. Id. at 3.
208. See Farber, supra note 17.
209. On follow-up, see ANGUS MORRISON-SAUNDERS & Jos ARTS, ASSESSING IMPACT:
HANDBOOK OF EIA AND SEA FOLLOW-UP (2004) [hereinafter MORRISON-SAUNDERS & ARTS,

HANDBOOK]. On studies of post-implementation audits (not framed and treated under the
umbrella of follow-up measures), usually focusing on the accuracy of predictions contained in
ex ante EIAs, see Angus Morrison-Saunders & John Bailey, Exploring the ETAEnvironmental
Management Relationship: Follow-up for Performance Evaluation (2000) (presented at IAIA
'00 Back to the Future conference, June 19-23, Hong Kong), http://researchrepository.
murdoch.edu.aul2443/; see also Ronald Bisset, Problems and Issues in the Implementation of
EIA Audits, 1 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 379, 380 (1980) (identifying the ex post
measurement of accuracy against ex ante predictions as one of the approaches to assessing
the effectiveness of EIA); Ralf Buckley, Environmentalaudit: review and guidelines, 7 ENVTL.
PLAN. L.J. 127 (1990); Ralf Buckley, Auditing the Precision and Accuracy of Environmental
Impact Predictionsin Australia, 18 ENvTL. MONIT. ASSESSMENT 1-23 (1991) (providing an
example of results from multi-projects audit, assessing the accuracy of predictions in light of
new information from monitoring). On adaptive environmental assessment and management,
see INT'L INST. FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND

MANAGEMENT (Crawford S. Holling ed., 1978); Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management for
a Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1339, 1339-45 (2011); Bernard T. Bormann et al.,
Adaptive

management, in

ECOLOGICAL

STEWARDSHIP:

A
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FOR

ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 505-34 (W.T. Sexton, A.J. Malk, R.C. Szaro, N.C. Johnson 1999
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emphasize the role of ex post EIA audits in promoting learning, with
2 10
the potential for improving the accuracy of future predictions. The
main perception, however, is that lack of institutionalized follow-up
in EIA frameworks has been a systemic weakness, even though
some jurisdictions have incorporated follow-up requirements in
their EIA systems. 211 One factor that may explain the relative
lack of adoption of ex post EIA is that the typical policy decision to
which EIA applies-usually involving a project, e.g., building a
highway or permitting the installation of a facility-means that
making changes after it has been constructed is often costly or
moot.

2 12

There tend to be few autonomous and systematic ex post
requirements of CBA for infrastructure projects; these analyses
tend to be reviewed, if at all, through ex post RIA and ex post EIA.
One prominent example of ex post CBA applied to an entire
regulatory program-a kind of programmatic ex post RIA-is the
requirement included in section 812 of the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 312), requiring EPA to conduct
and report to Congress a comprehensive analysis of the impact of
major programs under the CAA on the public health, economy, and
environment. 2 13 The law requires EPA to consider "costs, benefits
and other effects associated with compliance" with different
2 14
standards defined under the authority'delegated by the CAA.
eds.); DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE US DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE (2009).

210. Ben Dipper, Monitoringand Post-auditingin EnvironmentalImpact Assessment: A
Review, 41 J. ENVTL. PLAN. MGMT. 731, 733 (1998); see also Daniel A. Farber, Bringing
Environmental Assessment into the Digital Age, in TAKING STOCK OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT (Jane Holder and Donald McGillivray ed., 2007) (advocating collection and
analysis of past EIAs).
211. See MORRISON-SAUNDERS & ARTS, HANDBOOK, supra note 209, at 66, 158, 238-239
(describing the requirements for monitoring and auditing of EIA in Canada, the Netherlands,
Western Australia, Hong Kong, and Finland, and for regional planning in the U.K); Dipper,
supra note 210, at 735 (reflecting on the consequences of lack of mandatory monitoring
requirements by stating that from the project developer's point of view, it really does not
matter if predictions are accurate: the developer will suffer no consequences, and all that the
developer needs ex ante is educated guesswork). There is some degree of overlap in the
literature between follow-up and adaptive environmental management. Usually, follow-up
measures are referred to as including monitoring, audit, ex post evaluation, and management
activities. See MORRISON-SAUNDERS & ARTS, HANDBOOK, supra note 209, at 3; Jos Arts, Paula
Caldwell & Angus Morrison-Saunders, Environmental Impact Assessment Follow-up: Good
Practiceand FutureDirections-Findingsfrom a Workshop at the IAIA 2000 Conference, 19
IMPACT ASSESSMENT PROJECT APPRAIs. 175-185 (2001).

212. For a list of EISs submitted to EPA with the description of the policy decision to
which they apply, see Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Database,U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, https://cdxnodengn.epa.gov/cdx-enepa-public/actionleis/search (last visited Jan. 21,
2017).
213. Clean Air Act, Title VIII, § 812(a), 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 312 (2004)).
214. Id.
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Ex post reviews of RA sometimes occur through statutory
periodic reviews of the scientific basis for regulatory standards
(as for national ambient air quality standards and drinking water
quality standards, discussed above in Section III.A). One
requirement that comes close to an ex ante-ex post system for RA
is the post-market evaluation of drugs by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). In 2007, Congress amended the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to "enhance the postmarket authorities of the [FDA]."215 The Act, as amended, provides
for the possibility of a post-market surveillance system based on
performance standards as "rigorous as the ones already developed
for premarket review," 216 and possibly leading to an obligation to
conduct and periodically report on post-approval studies or clinical
trials of a drug. 2 17 As a result of the post-approval study, FDA
might require safety labeling changes, or other risk evaluation and
mitigation strategies.
IV. THE STATE OF PLAY OF RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Observing the formal adoption of retrospective review or ex
post RIA requirements is not the same as assessing their actual
implementation. There can be a gap between adoption and
implementation. Discussing the diffusion of ex ante RIA, Claudio
Radaeli called attention to the idea that RIA can sometimes travel
lightly and serve different justification logics. 2 18 The result can be
a common RIA "bottle" but containing different "wines"-or "even
no wine at all." 2 19 This assessment has been confirmed by OECD
and other studies of diffusion of ex ante RIA. 2 2 0 What is true about
215. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
216. Id. at § 910(6).
217. Id. at § 901(o)(3)(B). The goal of post-approval studies or clinical trials are: "(i) [t]o
assess a known serious risk related to the use of the drug involved; (ii) [t]o assess signals of
serious risk related to the use of the drug; (iii) [t]o identify an unexpected serious risk when
available data indicates the potential for a serious risk."
218. Claudio M. Radaelli, Diffusion Without Convergence: How PoliticalContext Shapes
the Adoption of Regulatory Impact Assessment, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POLY 924, 924 (2005).
219. Id.
220. The adoption-implementation gap issue has been mentioned by several studies.
OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 103; Radaelli, supra note 218; Fabrizio De
Francesco, Claudio M. Radaelli & Vera E. Troeger, Implementing Regulatory Innovations in
Europe: the Case of Impact Assessment, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POLY 491 (2012); RENDA, supra note
182, at 81. In 2011, OECD itself had reported after surveying the implementation of RIA in
member countries: "[e]x ante impact assessment remain a weak area. Nearly all countries are
struggling to establish the process so that it is taken seriously by officials and politicians;"
but also that "lt]here is growing awareness that this is a key tool." OECD, SUPPORTING
ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 163, at 112, 122.
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ex ante RIA can also be said about ex post IA requirements.
Different institutional structures in different jurisdictions make it
even harder to assess and compare what has been truly
implemented. As with ex ante RIA, different systems of ex post RIA
of existing regulations might be designed to work with varied
institutions and toward different goals. 221
In the case of RIA, it becomes further complicated to compare
systems and assess implementation due to the terminological
imprecision of the word "review"-'ften used in normative
requirements, oversight bodies, agency reports and academic
literature to address different types of regulatory initiatives.
As mentioned in Section III, in some systems, as in the U.K., EU,
and Australia, there exist different programs within the broad
category of reviews of existing regulation. In others, different
222
variations can be conflated under just a single label.
"Regulatory review" can mean revision of an existing rule, i.e., a
proposed policy change or repeal, with little or no analysis of
the past performance of the rule being "reviewed." In these cases,
there might be little or no hindsight and learning. On the other
hand, "regulatory review" can also mean a comprehensive ex
post evaluation of an existing rule, comparing expected to
realized impacts-positive and adverse-before any policy revision
is considered.
Where the literature suggests an adoption-implementation
gap in ex post RIA, this gap might reflect divergent understandings
of what is being implemented under the heading of "ex post RIA" or
"evaluation" or "retrospective review." As noted above, Coglianese
and OECD have criticized current practice as incomplete and
inadequate. 223 After trying to make sense of what kinds of "review"

.

221. Radaelli, supra note 218, at 929 (mentioning that RIA might perform different
functions in different countries, and could correspond to the "rebranding" of preexisting and
partial tools, with purposes that overlap with the most recent approach explicitly directed to
reviewing existing regulations-e.g., administrative burden reduction).
222. OECD's recommendation on ex post RIA attempts to measure more than just one
tool or approach to assessing and improving existing regulations, as it calls for member
countries to "[c]onduct systematic programme reviews of the stock of significant regulation
.. 2012 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 161, at 4 (Recommendation 5). Even under
OECD,
.
Recommendation 1, it specifies that countries should "[m]aintain a regulatory management
system, including both ex ante impact assessment and ex post evaluation as key parts of
evidence-based decision making." Id. at 6. Also, under Recommendation 3, it suggests
"[c]o-ordinating ex post evaluation for policy revision and for refinement of ex ante methods."
Id. at 9. Finally, in Recommendation 5 itself it uses "review" and "revision" to mean different
practices, suggesting that "[tihe methods of Regulatory Impact Analysis should be integrated
in programmes for the review and revision of existing regulations." Id. at 12.
223. See Coglianese, supra note 42 (finding that retrospective review "is today where
prospective analysis was in the 1970s: ad hoc and largely unmanaged."); OECD, POLICY
OUTLOOK, supranote 39, at 123 ("ex post evaluation by [U.S.] federal agencies remains patchy
and unsystematic.").
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are actually occurring, the general impression from secondary
sources is one of low or spotty implementation of ex post RIA. 2 2 4
Governments have only partially implemented retrospective review,
focusing on revisions to individual existing rules with the goal
of cutting administrative burden (red tape). 225 Often it is difficult
to determine from survey responses what, if anything, has really
been implemented. 226
224. Allio, supra note 199, at 196, 221, 240 ("post-implementation evaluations have not
yet been systematically implemented in most countries;" "ex post evaluation has remained
relatively side-lined," "systematic ex post evaluation is less common and the number and
performance of such reviews are rarely measured systematically;" "very few OECD countries
have actually deployed the tool systematically"); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ASSESSING PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2012 RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD
COUNCIL ON REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 9 (2013) ("few countries are actually

doing it systematically;" "some countries have undertaken pilot projects in ex-post
assessment, which have not yet been transformed into a systematic approach"); CHRISTIANE
ARDNT ET AL., 2015 INDICATORS OF REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE: DESIGN,
METHODOLOGY AND KEY RESULTS 7 (2015) ("[c]ountries are less advanced in ex post

evaluation where only a few countries systematically evaluate the impact of their regulations
ex post"); OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 112 ("[olverall, however, very few OECD
countries have actually deployed the ex post evaluation systematically").
225. Allio, supranote 199, at 200. ("few countries assess whether underlying policy goals
of regulation have been achieved, whether any unintended consequences have occurred and
whether there is a more efficient solution to achieve the same objective .... A more frequent
practice in OECD countries is partial ex post assessments focusing exclusively on regulatory
burdens"); OECD, SUPPORTING ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 163, at 9 ("[a] more frequent
practice in OECD countries is partial ex-post assessment, focusing exclusively on regulatory
burdens"); OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supranote 39, at 113-14 ("[m]ost countries have had ex
post evaluations based on administrative burden reduction with an assessment of compliance
cost using the standard cost model;" "[t]he survey results confirm the findings by Allio (2015)
that countries focus on partial ex post assessment of regulatory burdens and rarely assess
whether underlying policy goals of regulation have been achieved").
226. This is a problem of survey-based studies on both adoption and implementation of
ex post RIA. Sometimes well-intended studies contribute to the lack of clarity on what
exactly-and at what level-is being implemented. The OECD 2015 Regulatory Policy
Outlook study is based on survey data, including responses from government officials. It
proposed to measure, among other variables, systematic implementation of ex post evaluation
by OECD member countries. The research design is vulnerable, though, in the validity and
accuracy of its findings, because it is not clear if the answers truly measure different aspects
of ex post evaluation as defined by OECD itself to mean an analysis of how a regulation has
performed. The questionnaire on ex post evaluation uses at least seven different terms
referring to ex post evaluation ("ex post evaluations," "ex post evaluations by RIA," "major
review," "regular reviews to examine complaints and other problems," "internal review an
evaluation by the regulator," "reviews of existing regulation," and "ex post evaluations of
existing regulation"). The answers to questions using different terms are aggregated. This is
particularly worrisome, as the report itself admits that "[tlhe experience of conducting expost
evaluation varies considerably across countries and also domestically across different
Ministries or agencies within governments" and that "[tihis is in part due to the different
interpretations and understanding of what ex post evaluation means," and "there is the
opportunity to develop a broader understanding of ex post evaluation among OECD
countries." OECD, POLICY OUTLOOK, supra note 39, at 112, 113. Accuracy is also an issue in
the study, because responses came from government officials (the study claims that evidence
was gathered to verify the answers, but without specifying what evidence it gathered and
examined), and also due to the vague character of answers. For example, to the question "do
subordinate regulations include automatic evaluation requirements? (3C4b_.S)" the responses
could be "for some subordinate regulations;" to the question "have ex-post evaluations of
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A. PriorAssessments of the Practice
of Ex Post RIA in the U.S.
National audit offices have played a major role in investigating
and promoting implementation and compliance with RIA systems.
In the U.S., the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has since
the mid-1990s repeatedly assessed compliance of federal agencies
with different ex post RIA requirements, among other analytical
evidence-based tools used by federal agencies. 227 In its analysis,
GAO also addressed methodological and institutional challenges
facing agency practice of ex post RIA explaining its findings. 228
While trying to measure the level and quality of implementation of
existing subordinate regulations been undertaken in the last three years? (3C1-S)" the
response could be "yes, some" or "yes, frequently." The same issue is seen in prior
questionnaires used to measure adoption of ex post RIA systems; see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,

OECD REGULATORY INDICATORS QUESTIONNAIRE 2008 22 (2008)

("periodic ex post evaluation of existing regulation," "review," "modif[ication of] specific
regulations").
227. In its first reports of the kind, the focus of GAO's analysis was agency compliance
with the section 610 ex post RIA requirement of the RFA. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: STATUS OF AGENCIES? COMPLIANCE (1994) [hereinafter GAO,

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY]. In the following two decades, GAO reports addressed ex post-RIA
under different frameworks, including under the EOs 12,866, 13,563, 13,579, and 13,610.
Audit institutions of other countries have also followed GAO's example and taken on the task
of overseeing ex post RIA practice. See NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, POST IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW
OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENT OF REVIEW BY GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS (2009); NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, EVALUATION IN GOVERNMENT (2013); NAT'L AUDIT
OFFICE, THE BUSINESS IMPACT TARGET: CUTTING THE COST OF REGULATION (2016).
228. On the methodological side, see GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF EPA's REGULATIONS THROUGH RETROSPECTIVE
STUDIES (1999) [hereinafter GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS] (determining the baseline,

sorting out the effects of external sources on the behavior regulated entities, obtaining valid
cost data, quantifying benefits, time lag between realization of costs and benefits, use of "black
box models" in ex ante studies); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
HIGHLIGHTS OF A WORKSHOP ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MEASURES 13 (2005) [hereinafter

GAO, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE] (lack of methodological guidance, qualitative instead of
quantitative measurements of costs or benefits); GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REEXAMINING REGULATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND
TRANSPARENCY OF RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS 7, 11 (2007) [hereinafter GAO, REEXAMINING/

REVIEWS] (too short timeframe to conduct for mandatory triggers, lack of methodological
guidance by OMB/OIRA).
On institutional aspects, see GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS (resource constraints,
impartiality and authorship); Id. at 12 (misaligned incentives to acknowledge shortcomings
in regulatory performance); GAO, ECONOlMC PERFORMANCE, at 7 (lack of resources); Id. at 35
(lack of time and resources, information and data limitations, overlapping schedules and
review factors, scoping too broad, statutory barriers, limited public participation); GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: REGULATORY REVIEW PROCESSES COULD BE

ENHANCED (2014) (competing priorities and limited resources, difficulty in obtaining data);
see also GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REEXAMINING REGULATIONS: AGENCIES OFTEN MADE
REGULATORY CHANGES, BUT COULD STRENGTHEN LINKAGES TO PERFORMANCE GOALS 14-268

(Apr. 2014) [hereinafter GAO, REEXAMINING/AGENCIES] (finding rule revisions in more than
90% of agencies' retrospective reviews under EO 13,563, but lack of transparency in the
content of ex post RIAs).
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ex post RIA requirements, GAO faced the issue of imprecise
meaning of "review," leading to different practices by each agency. 229
Evidence in the reports reveal a track record of either full lack of
compliance or the simpler type of regulatory "review," i.e., costcutting revision of existing rules without evidence of a formal ex
post analysis of their past performance-something also perceived
by other oversight bodies, such as OIRA. 23 0 OIRA emphasized
the broad aims of its lookback effort, despite limited agency
cooperation. 231 When authentic ex post RIAs were found, GAO's
perception was that agencies followed an ad hoc approach, in
particular to selecting which rules to evaluate. 232 The shortcomings
found by GAO throughout the years have been compounded by
229. GAO, REEXAMINING/REVIEWS, supra note 228, at 1 ("there is no one standard
definition for the variety of activities that might be considered retrospective regulatory
reviews").
230. Reviewing the past practice of ex post RIA under the RFA during the 1980s, GAO
mentions absence of follow-up actions on the plans for periodic review formulated (sometimes
inadequately) by agencies. GAO, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY, supra note 227, at 12. It also
reports an analysis conducted by the Small Business Administration that in 1992 requires
agencies to submit "a summary of the results of their regulatory reviews." Id. Agencies who
responded mentioned follow-up actions adopted after the reviews without specifying whether
an ex post review of rule performance had taken place to inform subsequent proposed rule
changes. See id. at 14-15. In other instances, GAO itself might have contributed to the
confusion between review and revisions, such as when in 1997 it published a report measuring
revision actions against the normative backdrop of ex post RIA (and without verifying or
commenting on whether the revision actions were accompanied by ex post RIA studies). GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES' EFFORTS To ELIMINATE AND
REVISE RULES YIELD MIXED RESULTS 3 (1997) [hereinafter GAO, REFORMIREVISIONS]. In a

1999 report, GAO cited a report from the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
mentioning that "review of existing rules, as directed by [EO 12,866], 'has met with varying
degrees of failure. Clearly, getting agencies to review existing rules is much easier said than
done.'" GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra note 228, at 1. In 2005, GAO reported the
feedback from participants of its workshop participants (from government and academia)
observing that "few of the set of regulations has ever been looked at to determine whether
they have achieved their objectives, what they actually cost, and what their real benefits are.
In fact, the participant added, little is known about the impact of regulations once they are
adopted." GAO, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 228, at 10; see also GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: PRIOR REVIEWS OF FEDERAL REGULATORY
PROCESS INITIATIVES REVEAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENTS 7 (2005) ("[a]lthough the

economic performance of some federal actions is assessed prospectively, few federal actions
are monitored for their economic performance retrospectively").
231. In its 1997 report addressing ex post RIA, GAO mentions a memorandum from
OIRA to the heads of federal departments and agencies statingIt is important to emphasize what the lookback effort is and is not. It is not directed
at a simple elimination or expunging of specific regulations from the Code of Federal
Regulations. Nor does it envision tinkering with regulatory provisions to
consolidate or update provisions. Most of this type of change has already been
accomplished, and the additional dividends are unlikely to be significant. Rather,
the lookback provided for in the Executive Order speaks to a fundamental
reengineering of entire regulatory systems.
GAO, REFORM/REVISIONS, supra note 230, at 3.
232. See, e.g., GAO, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supranote 228, at 10.
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a persistent finding (contained in every GAO report): lack of
transparency and publication by federal agencies of the results of
the analysis and conclusions of each regulatory review and whether,
233
why, and how to revise existing rules.

Environmental regulation from EPA has received special
4
attention by GAO in its reports on ex post RIA.2 3 GAO found
that in the early 1980s, EPA had established a rule selection process
for review based on comments actively sought from interested
groups. 235 Still, no evidence was examined to clarify what practical
236 In 1999,
meaning EPA was attributing to regulatory review.
GAO published a dedicated report on "Assessing the Impacts of
237 The
EPA's Regulations Through Retrospective Studies."
investigation found that even though EPA had been implementing
many rule revisions with the goal of reducing administrative
burdens, assessments of the costs and the benefits of EPA's past
regulations had rarely been undertaken. 238 The study also revealed

233. Since its first 1994 report, GAO faced challenges in conducting its analyses of the
practice of ex post RIA due to lack of publication of results of such ex post evaluations by
agencies. In 1994, for instance, it based its findings predominantly on secondary sources
(annual reports by the Small Business Administration on compliance with the RFA
requirements). GAO, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY, supra note 227, at 2, 13. Lack of
transparency of ex ante RIAs also affected the quality of the few ex post RIA found by GAO.
See GAO, ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supranote 228, at 13 (mentioning that attempts to rerun
models used in ex ante analyses were impeded by lack of access to the models or the data used
in them). In the comprehensive study of 2007, GAO mentions that agencies reported having
conducting 1,300 "retrospective reviews" from 2001 to 2006. Yet, GAO could not compile a
"complete tally of all review[s]" that agencies said they had completed because "agencies
reported that they did not always document reviews that may have followed more informal
review processes." GAO, REEXAMINING/REVIEWS, supra note 228, at 5. For this reason, GAO
could not also confirm whether what agencies reported as "retrospective review" truly meant
what GAO itself had defined in the report as having the minimum features of an ex post RLAsee also id. at 7 (making as one of its recommendation the incorporation of "minimum
standards for documenting and reporting review results"); Id. at 14 (reporting that most of
"discretionary" reviews conducted by agencies are undocumented); Id. at 24, 28 ("[a]gencies
also reported that they often do not report the results of discretionary reviews at all, if they
did not result in a regulatory change;" and "[wihile some agencies reported the analysis
conducted in great detail in review reports, others summarized review analysis in a
paragraph or provided no documentation of review analysis at all. Some agencies did not
provide detailed reports because they did not conduct detailed analyses"). GAO, ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, supra note 228 (mentioning that the semiannual progress report became the
primary vehicle for agencies to report on the progress and results of their retrospective
analyses).
234. In its 1994 report, GAO found that EPA was the only agency with a specific RFA
compliance record mentioned in all twelve reports from the Small Business Administration
on annual compliance of federal agencies with the RFA. GAO, REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY,
supra note 227, at 3. In a 1997 report, EPA was one of the four agencies investigated. GAO,
REFORM/REVISIONS, supranote 230, at 2.
235. GAO, REGUIATORY FLEXIBILITY, supranote 227, at 12.
236. See id.
237. GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra note 228.
238. See id.
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lack of systematic adoption of ex post RIA. 2 39 "Of the 101
economically significant regulations issued by EPA from 1981
through 1998, only five were the subject of retrospective studies,"
and all of those were completed between 1997 and 1999.240 From
2001 to 2006, EPA reported to GAO that it conducted only 14 ex post
RIAs under RFA section 610.241
In 2007, the GAO published its most comprehensive study of
the practice of ex post RIA by U.S. federal agencies, analyzing
the period from 2001 to 2006.242 In the study, GAO found that EPA
had "conducted numerous retrospective reviews of EPA existing
regulations and standards" during the time period. 243 In addition to
examining agencies' implementation of retrospective regulatory
reviews, it proposed to report "the results of such reviews." 244
Initially, it intended to "provide insights concerning how agencies
assess existing regulations," i.e., ex post evaluation and not simple
rule revisions. 245 But due to lack of evidence of the analysis
undertaken for each review on whether to revise the existing rule
with an amendment or repeal, GAO had to rely on interviews. 246 In
239. Id. at 3.
240. Id. at 2. Of non-economically significant rules, the number of retrospective studies
was twenty-three in the same period. Id. at 3. Compare with GAO, REFoRM[REVISIONS, supra
note 230, at 13 (reporting that EPA had implemented 113 rule revision actions between
October 1995 and April 1997). Among the retrospective studies was the one mandated by the
Clean Air Act (section 812 of the 1990 amendments). GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra
note 228, at 3.
241. GAO, REEXAMINTNG/REVIEWS, supra note 228, at 86.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 86. In the same report, GAO depicts the EPA retrospective review process,
informing that after a rule is selected for review, the phase when the review occurs includes
the publication of notices of review and request for comments in the Federal Register. It is
unclear in the report if by the time such notices are published, the review is still ongoing or
is already concluded and the report is published for comments. A search for notice of review
on the web site of the Federal Register found only six instances. Id.
244. Id. at 57. The same issue occurred in the most recent GAO report on "retrospective
analysis." GAO seemed to have accepted that the initiatives reported by agencies in progress
reports were all ex post RIAs, and not simply proposed revisions to existing rules without a
full ex post analysis of past regulatory performance. See GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra
note 228, at 9.
245. GAO, REEXAMINING/REVIEWS, supra note 228, at 57 (emphasis added).
246. Id. The report said: "[o]ur assessment of a sample of agency reports review revealed
that, even for some reviews that provided a summary of their analysis, we could not
completely determine what information was used and what analysis the agency conducted to
form its conclusions" and "the content and detail of agency reporting varied, ranging from
detailed reporting to only one-sentence summaries of results." It still stated that "[slome
agencies told us that they typically only document and report the results if their reviews
result in a regulatory change." Id. at 28. Furthermore, it said that "[b]ecause agencies did not
always document discretionary reviews that they conducted, it is not possible to measure the
actual frequency with which they resulted in regulatory change." Id. at 32. Finally, "in our
review of the Federal Register and Unified Agenda, we were not always able to track
retrospective review activities, identify the outcome of the review, or link review results to
subsequent follow-up activities, including initiation of rulemaking to modify the rule;" and
that "[a]gencies' reporting of reviews appears largely ineffective." Id. at 44, 50.

Fall, 2016]

REGULATION GOING RETRO

43

the end, the 2007 GAO report did not answer whether in the
"numerous retrospective reviews" conducted by EPA there were
any ex post RIAs. 2 4 7 The predominance of simple rule revisions
rather than full ex post RIAs in the counts of supposed
"retrospective reviews" was further indicated by the GAO finding
that the bulk of reviews were a "response to OMB regulatory
reform nominations" (116 for EPA, in total). 248 Similarly, the
GAO report acknowledged that many "retrospective reviews" it
counted were informal. 249
The informal nature of "review" as a preceding step of rule
revisions, distinct from the analytical rigor (or perhaps indicating
the absence) of ex post RIA, was again observed in 2014.250 To some
extent, GAO contributed to this fact. 25 1 It still could not find
evidence of the substance of each ex post analysis leading up to
a rule revision due to lack of documented proof (which GAO
calls "informal" nature). 252 Still, it decided to assume that each
proposed rule revision was preceded by some, even informal, ex
post analysis of the prior rule. 2 5 3 To make things worse with respect
to the terminological confusion of the term "review," the report
mentioned the response from interviews in which agency officials
said that "when developing new rules, they examine existing
regulations related to the rule as a normal course of conducting

247. Id. at 86.
248. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). About this category, the report states: "[i]n addition,
agencies conducted reviews in response to OMB initiatives to solicit nominations for
regulatory reexamination, which were not statutorily mandated reviews or required by a
specific executive order, but were a part of executive branch regulatory reform efforts."
Id. at 13.
249. In addition, the study had some transparency issues. For instance, it describes
having assessed in a "more detailed" fashion a "limited sample of retrospective reviews"
conducted in the period of analysis. Yet, nowhere does the study identify these retrospective
reviews, nor explain the selection criteria. See GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supranote 228,
at 4. Also, the study mentions that "it is not possible to compile a complete tally of all reviews
that agencies completed, primarily because agencies reported that they did not always
document reviews that may have followed more informal review processes." Id. at 5. The study
also said that even the 1,300 reviews that it found completed during the period "may
understate the total because it does not account for all the undocumented discretionary
reviews conducted by agencies." Id. at 16. Again in 2014, GAO mentioned "agencies' plans
updates and progress reports provided only summary information about completed analyses.
Agencies did not always provide citations or references in the progress reports that a reader
could use to look up published rules that contain more detailed descriptions of agencies'
analyses and the underlying data." GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra note 228, at 17.
250. See GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra note 228.
251. See id. at 11.
252. Id.
253. Id. ("225 of the 246 completed analyses we examined (more than 90 percent), the
reviews led to agencies amending sections of the CFR to revise, clarify, or eliminate regulatory
text").
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business." 2 54 This is also true for EPA. 2 5 5 In August 2011, EPA

published its Final Plan for Periodic Retrospective Reviews of
Existing Regulation, responding to EO 13,563,256 in which it
said that "[i]n fact, of EPA's current workload, almost two-thirds
of out activity is a review of an existing regulation." 257 For
these reasons, the report also mentions that "[a]gency officials
expressed frustration at the misperception that they are not
reviewing existing regulations, when in fact most of their
regulatory activities involve such reviews." 2 5 8 But these "reviews"
may be informal or simply proposed rule revisions without an
ex post analysis of the prior rule. Whether such reviews are, in
fact, ex post RIAs, is a question that GAO could not assess given
the lack of publicly available ex post RIAs. 2 5 9

B. OMBIOIRA Reports to Congress
OIRA has played a key role in how ex post RIA has been
developing in the U.S. federal government. Complying with the
statutory mandate from appropriations legislation, OIRA has
annually published and submitted to Congress reports on the costs
and benefits of federal regulation-and, starting in 2012, on
agency compliance with EO 13,563.260 Environmental regulation
by EPA has figured prominently in the reports, scoring the highest
monetized net benefits among all agencies in every year but
2004.261 The reports follow in general the same format: reporting
cost and benefits by aggregating and annualizing the ex ante
254. Id. at 21.
255. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, IMPROVING OUR REGULATION: FINAL PLAN FOR
PERIODIC RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF EXISTING REGULATIONS (2011) [hereinafter EPA,
FINAL PLAN].
256. Id.

257. Id. at 4.
258. GAO, ASSESSING THE IMPACTS, supra note 228, at 21.
259. See id.
260. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (1997); Sections 645(a)(1) and (4) of the

Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 1996; Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-74. The provisions were annually renewed in
appropriations legislation until, in 2001, they became a permanent feature of what is now
known as the Regulatory Right-to-know Act. Sections 625(1) and (2) of Pub. L. 105-61
(Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998); Sections 638(a)(1) and (3) of
the 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act; Sections
628(a)(1) and (3) of the FY2000 Treasure and General Government Appropriations Act;
Sections 624A(a)(1) and (3) of Pub. L. 106-554 (Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act of 2001).
261. See Art Fraas & Randall Lutter, The Challenges of Improving the Economic
Analysis ofPendingRegulations: The Experience of OMB CircularA-4, 3 ANNu. REV. RESOUR.
ECON. 71-85, 73 (2011). The annual OIRA reports to Congress are available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforegregpol-reports-congress.
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RIA estimates of all regulations grouped by the same year of initial
adoption. 262 In addition to reporting the ex ante costs and benefits
of regulations issued in the year preceding the report, each report
also provides these figures for the ten previous years (in total and
per each year). 263
From 1997 to 2002, OIRA reported the estimates of costs and
benefits of federal regulations by combining forecasts contained in
both ex ante RIAs and ex post studies conducted by academics and
agencies. 264 Since its first report, OIRA has emphasized the need to
track information about the real impacts from the implementation
of federal regulations as a basis for recommendations on regulatory
reforms or eliminations. 265 In 2002, OIRA decided to rely solely on
forecasts contained in ex ante RIAs in order to comply with the duty
of reporting the aggregated costs and benefits of regulations. 266
262. The report acknowledges the limitations of omitting information about the streams
of benefits and costs during the implementation of each rule (in order to annualize the costs
and benefits). The problem of aggregating annualized estimates obscuring the actual timing
of benefits and costs was also noticed since early reports. See OFFICEOF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

81 (1999) [hereinafter OIRA, 1998 REPORT]. It also mentions the EPA rule for pulp and paper
effluent, which included annualized benefit estimates for a stream of benefits over 30 years.
Id. at 73.
263. See, e.g., id.
264. In its 1997 report, for instance, it combined the results of a 1991 study from Hahn
and Hird on the costs and benefits of regulations as of 1998, supplemented by a 1990 EPA
report on costs of regulations (Cost of a Clean Environment 1990), to which it added forecast
information from ex ante RIAs for regulations submitted issued since 1988. OIRA, 1997
REPORT, supra note 152, at Introduction. In the 1998 report, it mentioned "[b]ecause there
are no studies comparable to the Hahn and Hird or the EPA retrospective studies for the
regulations issued after 1998, we use information about costs and benefits from agency
prospective regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) to account for the major regulations that have
been issued since 1998." OIRA, 1998 REPORT, supra note 262, at 4. In 1998, it included the
EPA report on including retrospective study of the costs and benefits of the CAA. It mentions
"retrospective estimates," meaning that it understood the "estimates" in the statutory
provision as including ex post figures. Id. at 5. The report also discussed other retrospective
studies conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). Id. at 35, 38-43. OIRA even
mentioned in its 1998 report that "[iun the ordinary course, therefore, the best estimates of
the costs and benefits of regulation are likely to be retrospective studies" and "[blow well the
costs and benefit estimates of prospective studies predict actual costs and benefits is a
question that has not been answered." Id. at 8, 18.
265. In the 1997 Report, it included in one of its recommendations a measure directed to
itself, suggesting that "OIRA work toward a system to track the net benefits (benefits minus
costs) provided by new regulations and reforms of existing regulations for use in determining
the specific regulatory reforms or eliminations, if any, to recommend." OIRA, 1997 REPORT,
supra note 152, at ch. IV.
266. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION:
2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 39 (2002) [hereinafter OIRA,
STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION]. The report mentions the intense reaction that the

methodological change caused among reviewers and commenters. In response, OIRA
mentioned "many of the underlying studies are old and may no longer be reliable indicators
of today's regulatory costs and benefits." Id. at 40. As the report said "[w]e plan to expand the
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Eventually, the importance of ex post studies was again reflected in
the reports, but mostly in the form of caveats to the tables that relied
on ex ante information. 267 A prominent exception was the 2005
report, which included a chapter on "[v]alidation of benefit and
costs estimates made prior to regulation," in which it summarized
"post-regulatory information" and made comparisons with the
pre-regulation estimateS 268 for several rules subject to ex post
analysis. 269 Still, the annual report of costs and benefits relied
on the largely untested forecasts of ex ante RIAs. 2 70
In its annual reports, OIRA has varied in how it complied
with the statutory command to make "recommendations for
regulatory reform." Initially, OIRA interpreted the provision to
require the nomination of specific rules in need of revision. For
number of years covered by our estimates of the costs and benefits of major rules to ten from
the six-and-a-half currently included," but, at the same time, saying "[wle do not believe that
the estimates of the costs and benefits of regulations issued over ten years ago are reliable or
very useful for informing current policy decisions." Id. And also, "[o]ne does not need to know
full costs and benefits of all regulations to decide that regulatory costs should be held to an
increase (or decrease) of a specified amount over the next year." Id. at 41.
267. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS
AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES 8 (2003) [hereinafter OIRA, 2003 REPORT].

[T]he total cost and benefits of all Federal rules now in effect .. . could easily be a
factor of ten or more larger than the sum of the costs and benefits reported in Table
2. More research is necessary to provide a stronger analytic foundation for
comprehensive estimates of total costs and benefits by agency and program.
Starting in the 2013 report, OIRA would add error bands to the charts showing the annual
costs and benefits of the preceding ten years. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 23 (2014) [hereinafter OIRA,
2013 REPORT].

268. Most of these ex post studies were conducted by academics, and none of the studies
were prepared by EPA. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, VALIDATING REGULATORY
ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 42-43
(2005) [hereinafter OIRA, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS].

269. The 2005 OIRA report stated that: "[ciompared to the overall volume of Federal
regulatory activity, it is remarkable how few rules have been subject to validation studies."
Id. at 47. It also recognized that ex post review can help test the accuracy of ex ante RIAs:
[i]n order to promote more and high-quality validation studies, reviewer (3) urges
more investment in post-rule monitoring and data collection, including integration
of data from multiple states and localities involved in implementation of rules. Two
reviewers (3, 5) argued it was worth considering a requirement that major rules
contain a provision requiring agencies, and possibly the regulated entities, to
establish data collection systems that would facilitate ex post analysis of the rule at
some point in the future.
Id. at 51. OIRA's reaction to the comment was: "OMB agrees that these suggestions are
worthy of consideration." Id.
270. See id.
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this reason, it acknowledged the absence of sufficient data to inform
recommendations on major changes in regulatory programs. 271
And it reiterated the recommendation (to itself), set forth in the
1997 report, to develop a system to track the actual net benefits of
regulations. 272 Still, OIRA endorsed ongoing regulatory reform
initiatives by the agencies, which it listed in the report as proposed
rule revisions-without mentioning the existence of any ex post
analysis of the prior rules to justify the decision to revise these
rules. 2 7 3 In 2002, OIRA took a more active stance in using its implied
authority to make recommendations for review; it called for and
collected public comments and suggestions on regulations that
would be candidates for reform (i.e., amendment or repeal), which it
ranked according to its view on priority. 274 In subsequent reports,
OIRA continued to list and report on the status of such ongoing
reform initiatives. 275
Starting in the 2009 Report, OIRA increased the number
of warnings about the possibility of erroneous assumptions in ex
ante RIAs and, consequently, the figures it reported as costs

271. OIRA, 1998 REPORT, supra note 262, at 84, 89 ("At this stage we do not believe we
have enough information to make definitive recommendations on specific regulatory
programs based on the incomplete and uneven data that we discuss at length above."). This
was consistent with the realization that data from ex post studies were important to calculate
and report on the costs and benefits of regulations.
272. Id. at 89.
273. For example, NHTSA proposed to revise the existing standards and regulations for
the safety performance of airbags and the reflective marking on heavy truck trailers. Id. at
84.

274. In the 2002 report, OIRA mentioned having received suggestions addressing 316
different agency rules and guidance documents as candidates for review, "as well as to add,
modify, or rescind regulations." OIRA, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION, supra note 266,
at 4. In a breakdown of suggestions reported in 2002, it is evident that almost all of these
suggestions were proposed revisions, and not ex post reviews of the prior rules:
52.8 percent of the regulatory nominations sought modifications to existing or
proposed rules that would increase flexibility and 7.8 percent recommended
rescissions of existing rules. Over a quarter of the nominations advocated
extending regulation, either by making existing and proposed rules more stringent
(17.4 percent) or by promulgating new regulations (11.5 percent).
Id. at 75. See also OIRA, 2003 REPORT, supra note 267, at 28.
275. OIRA, 2003 REPORT, supra note 267, at 26-50; OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, PROGRESS IN REGULATORY REFORM: 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND
TRIBAL ENTITIES (2004); OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL,
AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 92-134 (2007); OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2008 REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2009).
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and benefits of federal regulations. 276 OIRA started to mention
expressly "retrospective analysis" as "an important way of
increasing accuracy" and as "a corrective mechanism."27 7 The 2009
report also reflected a change in how OIRA perceived its role
in making "recommendations for reform." 2 7 8 Instead of
spearheading the process of public comments and prompting
agencies to initiate revisions based on its classification of
priorities, OIRA decided to make broad recommendations on how
to improve regulatory policy in general. 279 This new conception of
"recommendations for regulatory reform" included "serious
consideration . . . given to retrospective analysis of the effects

of especially significant regulations." 280 In 2013, OIRA also
emphasized the role of rule design and monitoring systems to
enable future retrospective analyses--even though it did not
mention whether it was reviewing this feature in ex ante RIAs. 2 8 1
In its 2011 report, OIRA discussed the importance of
retrospective review to assess "what works and what does not,"
and its role in informing decisions on how to reform existing
rules. 28 2 In 2012, OIRA started to report specifically on how agencies
were implementing EO 13,563, complying with a new statutory
mandate from Congress.283 In the 2012 report, it included a
276. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL

ENTITIES 4, 8 (2010) [hereinafter OMB, 2009 REPORT].
277. Id. The caveats, present in every subsequent report and in every chart showing the
yearly costs and benefits of regulations, mentioned the need to implement retrospective
analysis. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE,

LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 4, 10 (2011) [hereinafter OIRA, 2011 REPORT] (noting the
instrumental role of retrospective analysis "to improve regulations, perhaps by expanding
them, perhaps by streamlining them, perhaps by reducing or repealing, perhaps by
redirecting them."); Id. at 4, 11, 5 ('agencies should promote retrospective analysis of existing
significant rules, with careful exploration of their actual effects and, when appropriate,
consideration of steps to streamline, modify, expand, or repeal them."). On a related issue,
discussing the importance of policy experimentation: Id. at 6; OIRA, 2012 REPORT, supranote
155, at 4; OIRA, 2013 REPORT, supra note 267, at 5; OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND
AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 5, 6, 18, 21 (2016)

[hereinafter OIRA, 2015 REPORT].
278. OMB, 2009 REPORT, supra note 276, at 4, 35-42.
279. Id. at 35.
280. Id. at 41. See OIRA, 2011 REPORT, supra note 277, at 49; OIRA, 2012 REPORT, supra
note 155, at 5-6 (repeating the same recommendation in the 2011 and 2012 reports).
281. OIRA, 2013 REPORT, supra note 267, at 9 ("rules should be written and designed, in
advance, so as to facilitate retrospective analysis of their effects, including consideration of
the data that will be needed for future evaluation of the rule's ex post cost and benefits").
282. Id. at 60 ("retrospective analysis can help show what works and what does not, and
in the process can help to promote repeal or streamlining of less effective rules and
strengthening or expansion of those that turn out to do more good than harm").
283. See OIRA, 2012 REPORT, supra note 155.
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section on "retrospective review." 2 84 Nonetheless, similar to GAO,
it either glossed over the possible mismatch between ex post RIA
and simple rule revisions, allowed by the conceptual vagueness
of the term "review"; or it gave credence to agencies' suggestions
that every rule revision was preceded by an ex post RIA,
notwithstanding the absence of documented evidence of such
analyses. 285 OIRA referred to the agency preliminary plans for
review, required by EO 13,563, and the "hundreds of reforms,
candidate rules for review, and initiatives already underway,"
as examples of "retrospective reviews." 2 8 6 The possible conflation
of ex post RIA and rule revision is evident when the report
mentions, after listing rule change initiatives, that "[i]n this way,
and consistent with Executive Order 13,610, OIRA seeks to create
a culture of retrospective analysis, in which existing rules (whether
issued in the very recent past or decades ago) are subject to
assessment and continuing evaluations, with public input." 28 7
Even if OIRA seemed in these reports to conflate ex post RIA
with regulatory revision, and did not clarify whether rule revisions
were preceded by full ex post RIAs, it did seem to notice that a more
rigorous approach would be desirable in the future. In its 2013 and
2014 reports, in the chapter on recommendations for reform -and
agency compliance with EO 13,563, OIRA made the following
statement:
The early phase of retrospective review implementation,
discussed later in this chapter and in the most recent
previous Reports, has been characterized by fairly
straightforward reforms, such as switches from paper
to electronic notifications. Moving ahead, however, OMB
expects agencies will progress to more analytically-driven
retrospective reviews, where the analyses are akin to
currently-conducted RIAs (but have the advantage of
post-implementation data) . .. . Agencies would, however,
examine all or most aspects of a previous cost-benefit
analysis, not just the surprising or analytically novel
results that would typically receive attention from
284. Id. at 64.
285. Id. at 56.
286. Id. at 64. In every case, each initiative corresponds to a decision to revise an existing
regulation, without any information on whether such decision was informed by a formal ex
post assessment of its performance. The report includes two initiatives from EPA, both
corresponding to rule revisions: a plan to propose a rule to reduce burdens on hazardous waste
generators, and the elimination of an obligation for states to require air pollution vapor
recovery systems at local gas stations. Id. at 65-66. The 2013 OIRA report also mentions rule
revisions as examples of retrospective analyses. OIRA, 2013 REPORT, supra note 267, at 9.
287. OIRA, 2012 REPORT, supra note 155, at 69.
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academic journals. Perhaps more importantly, agencies have
the ability to facilitate retrospective analysis at the time
when rules are issued; for example, in some cases, they
can require-as a provision of a rule-the submission of
data that would be necessary for assessing that rule's
effectiveness. OMB recommends that agencies pursue
retrospective review in a comprehensive fashionencompassing continual look-back at administrative
procedures; thorough cost-benefit analysis of previouslyissued, nonadministrative regulations; and the incorporation
of plans for retrospective policy assessment into rulemaking
currently underway. 288
In its 2015 report, OIRA did not seem to follow through on its
calls for ex post RIA of agency rules, distinct from the need to
propose rule changes. 289 Instead, the report only mentioned
retrospective analysis in five of its pages-fewer than in prior
reports. 290 In addition to including the same caveats to figures on
costs and benefits based on prospective RIA studies, and
emphasizing the role of retrospective analysis as a corrective
mechanism, the 2015 report adopted a more formal approach when
reporting on how agencies are conducting (or not conducting) their
ex post RIAs. 29 1 In the 2015 chapter on recommendations for reform,
OIRA did not mention, as it had in the 2012 and 2013 reports,
agency compliance with EO 13,563 or examples of retrospective
review initiatives. 292 It simply mentioned, in a brief response to a
comment, that "[w]e have stated throughout this Report, and
through other avenues, that the retrospective review of regulations
continues to be a very high priority for OMB." 2 9 3
C. State Experience
If studies of the adoption of ex post RIA by states are rare, even
rarer have been those investigating whether and how those states
that have adopted it have truly implemented ex post RIA. 2 9 4 One
288. OIRA, 2013 REPORT, supra note 267, at 56; OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 54 (2015).

289. See OIRA, 2015 REPORT, supra note 277.
290. Id. at 6, 18, 21, 54, 109.
291. Id. at 6, 8, 21.
292. Id. at 54. Compare with OIRA, 2012 REPORT, supra note 155, at 65-66.
293. OIRA, 2015 REPORT, supra note 277, at 109.
294. Moreover, the studies of ex post RIA in the states face the same challenge of
analyses of ex ante RIA in practice: assuring validity of findings when adopting a research
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of the first studies of this kind was published in 2000 by Robert
Hahn, in which he found that "[s]tates do not always comply
with requirements for reviews of existing regulations." 295 The 2010
study of regulatory review in the U.S. states, conducted by Jason
Schwartz, also attempted to assess the extent of implementation of
periodic retrospective review of regulations. 296 The investigation
found that that of the thirty states where periodic review of
regulations was either encouraged or mandatory, only four had
active (and, apparently, frequent) periodic reviews of existing
regulation (Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania); 297 Six
showed some evidence of the practice (Florida, Missouri, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Vermont, and Virginia); 298 two had only pro
forma systems (Indiana and New Jersey); 299 and two had
inconsistent or sporadic practices (Michigan and California). 300
Yet even states with evidence of frequent periodic reviews (and
those with only some signs of practice) implemented partial
approaches to a full ex post RIA: by either revealing a deregulatory
bias (Hawaii and Iowa), restricted focus on impacts on small
businesses (Hawaii), or an ad hoc nature (Pennsylvania).3 0 1
In their 2016 study, Stuart Shapiro et al. reported the findings
of the analysis of ex post RIA adoption and implementationvin
Delaware, Florida, Nevada, and Rhode Island. 302 New developments
in the adoption of reviews of existing regulations had occurred in
the four states since the 2010 study by Schwartz. 303 With the
exception of Rhode Island, governor's EOs were the legal source for

design that relies on surveys of agency officials and questionnaires vulnerable to the reviewrevision conceptual mismatch. Another frequent limitation is the lack of precision and
specificity regarding which documents the study analyzed in order to supplement the survey
data.
295. Hahn, supra note 76, at 882.
296. SCHWARTZ, supra note 107, at 13. But the questionnaire used by the study did not
provide a definition of"reviews of existing regulations" in the question about implementation
of ex post RIA. Id. at 457 ("does your agency conduct 'ex post' review of existing regulations
(e.g., a recurring review every so many years of the efficacy, efficiency, fairness, or legality of
existing regulations)?"). For this reason, the question regarding ex post RIA could have been
understood by respondents as only pertaining to a program for simple rule revisions, without
necessarily reviewing past performance of the rule being revised.
297. Id. at 208, 231, 258, 351.
298. Id. at 200, 282, 326, 384, 389.
299. Id. at 224, 304.
300. Id. at 268, 173.
301. Id. at 208, 231, 351.
302. Shapiro, Borie-Holtz & Markey, supra note 159. The paper mentions that its
findings were based on case studies, and that "[i]n each state we reviewed documents on
retrospective review. We also interviewed numerous individuals who were involved with their
state's lookback efforts." Id. at 35. Yet, it does not specify which documents it reviewed, nor
the specific role of each interviewee in each state's ex post RIA system.
303. See id; compare with, SCHWARTZ, supra note 107.
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the obligation to conduct retrospective reviews. 304 In short periods
of time, agencies reported having reviewed over a hundred rules
(1,600 over 17 months, in the case of Rhode Island). 305 The evidence
suggests that the reviews were predominantly "cleaning the books
exercises," i.e., another apparent instance of cost-cutting rule
revisions being reported as ex post RIA. 306 As the authors of the
study say, "[g]iven that most of the reviews in these states (which
involved looking at hundreds of regulations) took a year or two, it is
reasonable to conclude that there was little careful analysis of the
regulations in many states where retrospective reviews were
conducted." 307
D. EPA "RetrospectiveReviews" under EO 13,563
Responding to EO 13,563, in August 2011 EPA published its
Final Plan for Periodic Reviews of Existing Regulations. 308 When
describing the process of retrospective review, it includes two
different steps ("conduct retrospective reviews" and "make
necessary modifications").30 9 In the report, EPA declares that it
"has a long history of thoughtfully examining its existing
regulations to make sure they are effectively and efficiently meeting
the needs of the American people,"31 0 suggesting that such
examination would amount to ex post RIA. The document did not,
however, actually list regulations for ex post RIA; instead, it
announced that the "plan describes a large number of burdenreducing, cost-saving reforms, including thirty-five priority
initiatives."3 1 1 After publishing its final plan, EPA posted on its
website ten semiannual progress reports, complying with section 6
of EO 13,563. An overview of the progress reports show that by
retrospective review, EPA considers a process that starts with
collecting data and ends with the publication of a final rule revising
an existing rule; or with an improvement of an information
collection or compliance system related to the implementation of a
rule.

304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 35.
307. Id.
308. EPA, FINAL PLAN, supra note 255.
309. EPA describes the last step of the process as: "[a]fter collecting comments from the
public and conducting our own analyses, EPA intends to make modifications to any regulation
that warrants it, as determined during Step 3." Id. at 52.
310. Id. at 4.
311. Id. at 5.
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In examining the retrospective review initiatives in each of
EPA's progress reports from January 2012 to January 2016, we
found that EPA reported a total of fifty-five different "retrospective
312
review initiatives," of which twenty changed to completed status.
Review initiatives that led to new rulemaking processes (rule
revisions) were only reported as completed when the final rule was
published. Some of the review initiatives EPA included in its reports
addressed administrative or information collection aspects of
existing rules. These initiatives usually resulted in changes that did
not require a new rulemaking process. Of the twenty initiatives that
changed status to complete, only four led to a new rulemaking
process and one represented a partial ex post RIA. The remaining
fifteen initiatives with complete status resulted in the issuance
of new guidelines or other policy documents, changes in websites,
or even a webinar, mostly intended to reduce administrative
burdens.3 1 s
Of the thirty-five remaining ongoing initiatives (i.e., not
reported as completed), sixteen have reached the proposed rule
status, with a new rulemaking process and the publication of an
NPRM. Many of the retrospective review initiatives, when first
reported, already had rule revision as their stated intent. 3 14 Since,
in theory, the conclusion of an ex post RIA informs whether a rule
change is required, EPA might have completed a total of twenty-one
ex post RIAs in the four year period. 3 15
But based on the summary description of each initiative
contained in each progress report of the twenty-one retrospective
review initiatives, sixteen are measures intended to promote the
reduction of administrative burdens, four are other rule change
initiatives with the goal of promoting other kinds of improvement,
and only one corresponds to an independent (but partial) ex post
RIA. 3 1 6 Of the nineteen remaining ongoing or planned initiatives
that have not reached a proposed rule status, fifteen state a goal of
reducing administrative burdens, with the remaining four stating a
3 17
goal of implementing other types of regulatory improvements.
312. The total number of retrospective review initiatives reported in EPA's progress
reports since Jan. 2012 is 216 (including repetitions).
313. None of these initiatives have an assigned RIN number-with the exception of RIN
2050-AG72, initiated in 2012 and concluded in 2014, leading to the publication of a Notice of
Data Availability (NODA).
314. See, e.g., EPA, FINAL PLAN, supra note 255 (this intent is evident in the "next steps"
section of each planned retrospective review initiative, with many already including mentions
of proposed rules).
315. The total of twenty-one corresponds to sixteen ongoing initiatives that already had
an NPRM, four completed initiatives leading to new rulemaking processes, and one partial ex
post RIA. See Figure 1.
316. See Figure 2.
317. See Figure 3.
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Figure 1. Retrospective Review initiatives reported in EPA's
progress reports that might have employed ex post RIA
4 new rulemakings

55
Retrospective
Review (RR)
imitiatives

. 20ORR
0 .R
initiatives with
"complete" status

35 ongoing RR
initiatives

Figure 2. Content of review
initiatives reported in EPA's
progress reports with
complete status or with a
proposed rule revision
leading to a new
rulemaking process

1 ex post RIA
1
15 non-rulemaking
initiatives
16 initiatives
with NPRM
19 initiatives
without NPRM

Figure 3. Content of ongoing
review initiatives reported
in EPA's progress reports
that have not reached the
NPRM phase

1

* administrative burden reduction
proposed improvements
* autonomous ex post RIA

* administrative burden reductions
* proposed improvements

Confirming the GAO findings, there was no evidence of
publication of any report with the findings of ex post RIAsassuming that they indeed took place-related to the review
initiatives that EPA reported as either completed (and leading to
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a final rule) or having reached the proposed rule status. 318 The third
step of EPA's retrospective review ("conduct retrospective review"),
as described in its final plan, remains largely opaque.3 1 9 For the
initiatives that resulted in a new rulemaking process, there is
no information in the progress reports on whether the resulting
new rule triggered a new ex ante RIA requirement. This information
can only be found by cross-referencing the RIN number of the
retrospective review initiative in the retrospective review progress
report with the same number identifying the proposed rule in
OIRA's database. Cross-referencing this information reveals that
of the twenty initiatives classified as completed with a final rule or
at the stage when a proposed rule was already published, eleven
were accompanied by new ex ante RIAs. Of these eleven initiatives
accompanied by new ex ante RIAs, nine were of non-economically
significant rules and only two were of economically significant
rules. If complying with EO 12,866, nine of the regulatory reform
initiatives could not have been considered a major regulatory action
to trigger an RIA.
An examination of the ex ante RIAs submitted to OIRA from
August 2011 (date of EPA's final plan on retrospective review) to
January 31, 2016 showed, during this time, 217 ex ante RIAs were
submitted by EPA to OIRA (41 of economically significant major
rules and 176 of non-economically significant major rules). Since
eleven of the ex ante RIAs submitted by EPA were preceded by
retrospective review initiatives reported in EPA's progress reports
on retrospective review, 206 ex ante RIAs of proposed rules or rule
revisions were therefore unaccompanied by the same type of
retrospective review. 320 No evidence was found of self-standing
reports providing the conclusions of each completed retrospective
318. See GAO, REEXAMINING/AGENCIES, supranote 228. There is no database in the U.S.
with data on retrospective review initiatives. All the information is contained in individual
electronic files for semiannual progress reports of each agency.
319. See EPA, FINAL PLAN, supra note 255.
320. See Figure 4: Evidence of policy cycle approach in ex ante RIAs submitted by EPA
during the same period of reporting of retrospective review initiatives under EO 13,563. One
important piece of information is how many of these 206 ex ante RIAs, not preceded by
retrospective reviews, corresponded to rule revisions (since new rules could not have been
preceded by ex post RIA). Of these 206, at least 45 (43 of non-economically significant major
rules and 2 of economically significant major rules) indicate rule revisions in the title
(containing either the word "amendment(s)" or "revision(s)"). Still, this probably
underestimates the number of proposed rule changes, because rule revisions could also use
other words in the title. Of the 11 RIAs resulting from completed retrospective review
processes, only 4 had in the title one of the two words mentioned above. If the proportion (4
out of 11) is the same for all RIAs, i.e., if rules with one of the two revision-indicating words
in the title correspond only to 36.3% of all the rules that are in reality rule revisions, then the
total amount of rule revisions of the 206 ex ante RIAs without following a completed
retrospective review process would amount to 123 RIAs, not 45.
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review initiative (as EPA publishes for RFA section 610 reviews). 321
Instead, the only documentation available that might contain
information related to such analyses is what accompanies the
NPRM and ex ante RIA reports of rule revisions that follow a
complete retrospective review process. Searching for any such
evidence, we examined the eleven ex ante RIAs that followed a
formal retrospective review process, as reported in the OIRA
database as matching the same RIN numbers of proposed rules or
final rules mentioned in EPA's progress reports on retrospective
review during the same period. 322 Only two of these eleven ex
ante RIAs mention that the proposed rule revision was a result of
a preceding retrospective review initiative. Some report the
publication of notices before an NPRM, with the goal of inviting
comments (e.g., an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking or a
Notice of Data Availability.) Others mention the use of data
generated during the period of implementation of the preceding rule
as an input to formulate the proposed revision being accompanied
by the ex ante RIA. None mentioned any ex post assessments of the
accuracy of the predictions made in the ex ante RIA of the rule now
being revised.
Figure 4. Evidence of policy cycle approach in ex ante RIAs
submitted by EPA during the same period of reporting of
retrospective review initiatives under EO 13,563

RIAs

Economically

Econoicanl
significant

NonNn
economically
significant

Preceded by a
retrospective review
Not preceded by a
retrospective review

167

Since August 2011, the only retrospective review initiative
reported by EPA under EO 13,563 with the features of a true ex
post RIA was first identified in the September 2012 progress
report, under the title "the costs of regulations: improving cost

321. See infra n. 352-54 and accompanying text.
322. The ex ante documentation of these eleven proposed rule changes are related to the
following RINs: 2040-AF16, 2060-AQ97, 2060-AQ91, 2050-AG20, 2070-AKO2, 2050-AG39,
2050-AG70, 2050-AG77, 2060-ASO2, 2060-AQ54, and 2060-AQ86. See dataset published at
http://bit.ly/2cDOiGt.
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estimates." 323 It was eventually published in August 2014 as an ex
post study of five regulations, distinct from any proposed rule
revisions. 324 The purpose of the study was to compare the ex
ante cost estimates with the ex post realized costs during the
implementation of these five EPA regulations. 325 The research goal
was to look for patterns of overestimation or underestimation of
costs and identify the factors that might explain them, thus
improving the accuracy of new ex ante studies (and RIAs); 3 26 and
to identify key uncertainties in the ex ante estimates. 327 This study
stands out as at least seeking the kind of insights on ex ante RIA
accuracy that we argue could come from broader application of
ex post RIA to multiple rules. Five economically significant rules
were selected for review, organized by environmental media, source
categories, and regulatory mechanisms (e.g., performance standard
versus prescriptive regulation). 328 EPA intended this study to be one
of many, with the subsequent studies adopting a stratified random
sampling strategy to define which rules should be evaluated. 329
The study reached tentative results, given the low availability of
compliance cost information, in particular at the facility level. 3 30 The
323. U.S.

ENVTL.

PROT.

AGENCY,

EO

13563

PROGRESS

REPORT,

SEPTEMBER

5 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/eparetro
2012,
reviewprogressrpt-sept2012.pdf.
324. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RETROSPECTIVE STUDY OF THE COSTS OF EPA
REGULATIONS: A REPORT OF FOUR CASE STUDIES (2014) [hereinafter EPA, RETROSPECTIVE
STUDY].

325. Id. at vii. The report detailed, "[a] careful assessment of ex post cost drivers could
help identify systematic differences between ex post and ex ante compliance cost estimation
and, ultimately, allow for improvements in the way in which ex ante analyses are done." Id.
at 1.
326. Id. One interesting feature of the study was the acknowledgment by EPA of the
limited number of retrospective analyses. The study was published in 2014, almost three
years after EPA had begun to report semiannually its retrospective review initiatives under
the mandate of EO 13,563. This fact suggests further evidence that in EPA's perspective,
'retrospective review initiatives" correspond predominantly to rule revisions, without
necessarily being preceded or informed by an ex post RIA of the rule being revised. See id. at
Acknowledgements, v, vii.
327. Id. at vi-vii. For example, yield losses associated with different alternative
pesticides, in the case of the Methyl Bromide critical use exemption rule. Id. at 78.
328. Id. at vii. The five rules were: (1) the National Primary Drinking Water Regulation
for Arsenic (2001/2004); (2) the Integrated National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAP) and Effluent Guidelines for Pulp and Paper (also known as the Cluster
Rule) (1998); (3) the NESHAP for Chemical Recovery Combustion Sources at Kraft, Soda,
Sulfite and Stand-Alone Semichemical Pulp Mills (2001); (4) the Locomotive Emission
Standards (1998); (5) the Methyl Bromide Critical Use Nomination for Preplant Soil Use for
Strawberries Grown for Fruit in Open Fields on Plastic Tarps (2004-08). Id. at 16.
329. Id. at 16. The study criticized the existing literature of ex post cost assessment as
"unlikely to form a representative sample of the universe of environmental rules that have
been promulgated. Many of the survey articles summarize the same sets of underlying
studies, which means that there is substantial overlap." Id. at 6. In the concluding chapter of
the report, it indicated additional rules for retrospective analysis. Id. at 228.
330. Id. at 227.

58

JOURNAL OFLAND USE

[Vol. 32:1

study team had to consult industry compliance experts to gather ex
post data for all but one regulation, since publicly available data
sources were incomplete.3 31 In addition to the challenge of having
little or no information, the study also highlighted the difficulty of
forming a reasonable counterfactual and disentangling compliance
costs from other factors. 332 In conclusion, the study found mixed
results in terms of overestimation and underestimation of costs, and
overestimation of costs for one rule. 3 33 Notwithstanding the final
report mentioning the intention of conducting future studies of the
same kind, in an interview in 2016, one of the authors of the report
said that other analyses of the type were not high on the priority
agenda of EPA, with no other ex post study of the kind being
planned. 334
At least one of the rules studied by EPA had a subsequent
revision (and a new rulemaking process) for which an ex ante RIA
was prepared-Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: The 2016 Critical
Use Exemption from the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, with an
NPRM published in June 2015.335 We examined its ex ante RIA
report to search for any mention of the prior ex post study and
any evidence of a concerted effort to improve monitoring and data
collection on input information-one of the main limitations found
in the ex post study. But nothing in the ex ante RIA or the NPRM
mentions the previous ex post study. In the electronic docket,
there is a document in which EPA explains why there was no
economically feasible alternative to the use of methyl bromide for
the specific use studied in the 2014 report. 336 The 2014 ex post study
had identified information on agricultural yield losses associated
with alternative fumigants as being key missing data, possibly
leading to overestimation of costs.

33 7

In the 2016 proposed rule,

there is no discussion or additional information on that key input
to estimating the costs of alternative policy decisions.33 8
331. See id. at viii.
332. Id.
333. The ex post review of National Primary Drinking Water Regulation for Arsenic and
the 1998 Locomotive Emission Standards found mixed results (ranging from -12% to +69% on
capital costs, and -58% to -19% on operation costs for the former). Id. at 142, 205. The review
of the Cluster Rule found overestimation of capital costs, ranging from 30% to 100%, and a
review of the MACT II rule found overestimation of capital costs by 25% and 200+% on annual
costs. Id. at 52, 205.
334. Anonymous EPA official, on file with authors.
335. 80 Fed. Reg. 33,460 (proposed June 12, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82).
336. U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
2016
Critical
Use
Nomination
for
Strawberries 3-4, (2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-20130369-0011 [hereinafter EPA, Strawberries].
337. EPA, RETROSPECTIVE STUDY, supra note 324, at 69, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 91, 93.
338. EPA, Strawberries, supra note 336. There is no specific RIA document for the 2016
Critical Use Exemption Rule in the electronic docket.
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EPA has also conducted Section 610 reviews mandated by the
RFA. A page of its website lists a total of forty-one ongoing, planned,
and completed such reviews since 1997.339 From August 2011 to
January 2016 (the period covered by the Final Plan and progress
reports on retrospective review under EO 13,563), the website lists
six completed and two ongoing reviews; however, neither the final
plan nor the semiannual retrospective review progress reports
contain any mention of the Section 610 reviews.340 The database
provides a link to the semiannual agenda, which in turn reports the
number of the electronic docket for each review. In contrast to the
"retrospective review initiatives" reported under EO 13,563,341 the
Section 610 reviews are not proposed rule revisions. All six reviews
concluded between August 2011 and January 2016 have reports
distinct from any rule revision, and all six concluded that there was
a continued need for the regulation. 34 Only one review conducted
additional analysis compared to the preceding ex ante RIA; 3 4 3 all
others made qualitative claims that it was not necessary to revise
the rule, mostly relying on and simply responding (qualitatively) to
public comments received during the review process. 344 None of the
reports mention the assessment of the accuracy of ex ante data in
light of information from costs and benefits from implementation of
each rule being reviewed.
Compared to other jurisdictions with dedicated ex post RIA
programs-distinct from rule revisions supported by only simplified
analyses-the reality of EPA's implementation of ex post RIA is not
339. Section 610 Reviews, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/reg-flex/
section-610-reviews (last visited on Jan. 21, 2017).
340. Even in the Final Plan, EPA mentioned that it intended to "coordinate our small
business retrospective reviews, required by Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, with
other required reviews (e.g., under the CAA). This will aid in meeting EO 13563's directive to
reduce or eliminate redundant, inconsistent, or overlapping requirements." EPA, FINAL PLAN,
supra note 255, at 47.
341. See EPA, RETROSPECTIVE STUDY, supra note 324.

342. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Ground Water Rule, 81 Fed. Reg.
37,373; Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Nonroad Diesel Engines and Fuel, 79 Fed.
Reg. 76,771; National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP):
Reinforced Plastic Composites Production, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,315; National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 79 Fed. Reg. 76,771; Heavy-Duty Engine
Emission Standards and Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 79 Fed. Reg. 1216; and
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminant Monitoring, 77 Fed. Reg. 8004.
343. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 79
Fed. Reg. 76,771.
344. Most review reports are short in length, ranging from two to sixteen (average of six)
pages. No review-not even the two containing new ex post data-mentioned ex post
assessment of the impact of the regulation on large, medium, or small businesses. No review
contained any quantitative assessment of benefits.
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significantly different.34 The European Commission database
contains reports of thirty-four ex post evaluations of environmental
policies, of which fourteen are related to primary and secondary
legislation (the remaining address programs and plans). 34 In the
U.K., after the first five-year period for triggering review clauses,
the results of the first post-implementation reviews have still not
been reported in the IA database (so far, there are only five). 34 7
According to the U.K. DEFRA Better Regulation Team, as of
November 2015 no post-implementation reviews had been
completed, and most reviews had taken place under the red tape
challenge program. 3 @ In Australia, only four ex post evaluations
of environmental primary and secondary legislation have .been
completed and reported. 349 In these three jurisdictions, as at EPA,
there have been many more rule revisions with the goal of
promoting simplification and reduction of administrative burdens
and far fewer ex post RIAs designed to test the accuracy of ex
ante RIAs or to learn about what works in policy design.
V. GOING RETRO: ADVANCING
REGUIATORY HINDSIGHT

Our review of retrospective review and ex post RIA in U.S.
and international environmental regulatory policy illustrates the
gap between adoption and implementation. Our findings indicate
increasing adoption yet limited implementation of retrospective
analysis. Meanwhile, most retrospective review that does occur
appears to be aimed at reducing cost or administrative burden
through specific rule revisions, while little use of ex post RIA is
aimed at a broader scope of impacts or at testing the accuracy of ex
ante RIA or the performance of policy design. What EPA has been
reporting as retrospective review initiatives are mostly, it seems,
revisions of individual existing rules, often without a documented

345. Admittedly, a proper benchmark should take into account the fact that
requirements for periodic review of regulations have been adopted in the U.S. much earlier
than in other jurisdictions-at least since 1978. See supra Section II.
346. Including only evaluations from the DG Environment and DG Climate Action, from
2001 to the present. Smart-regulationEvaluation Search, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/
smart-regulationlevaluation/search/search.do (last visited on Jan. 21, 2017) [hereinafter EC,
Smart-regulationEvaluation Search].
347. NAT'L ARCHIVES, UK Impact Assessments Post Implementation Review,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia.access?stage=Post%20Implementation%2Review
(last
visited on Jan. 21, 2017).
348. Email on file with authors.
349. Office of Best Practice Regulation, Best Practice Regulation Updates, List of Postimplementation Reviews Completed and Published, AUSTRALIAN GOV'T DEP'T OF THE PRIME

MINISTER & CABINET (2016), http://ris.pmc.gov.aulsites/default/files/compliance-reporting/
pir/list-pir-completed-and-published.pdf (last visited on Jan. 21, 2017).
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analysis of the prior rule and its ex ante RIA. The majority of such
revisions tend to lead to non-economically significant rule changes,
aimed at cutting red tape or implementing minor improvements.
And compared to ex post RIA, retrospective review of EIA appears
even more scant.
The potential role of retrospective review or ex post IA in
learning-as a mechanism to track and compare the performance
of existing regulations, and thereby to learn how to improve ex
ante IA estimates and ex ante policy design decisions-lies largely
unrealized to date. Environmental regulation is going retro more
in rhetoric than in reality. While individual rule revisions may help
reduce compliance costs, they do not seize the opportunity for
broader learning that ex post RIA can offer about the full impacts
of the past rule (including not only administrative burden but full
social costs, benefits, and ancillary impacts), the accuracy of ex ante
RIA methods, and the merits of alternative policy designs. 350 Errors
in ex ante estimation methods may persist, leading to lower net
social benefits than expected from new and existing policies. Even
narrow retrospective review initiatives that yield a revision of an
individual rule may be based on inaccurate estimates of cost,
savings, if they are only comparing the revision to the ex ante cost
estimates-and not to the ex post realized costs-of the rule beingz
revised. If regulatory policy continues to be formed by a sequence of
largely untested forecasts, human foresight is fallible and learning
from hindsight is playing too small a role.
There is also little indication of a policy cycle linking ex ante
to ex post RIA. Few new agency rules (and their ex ante RIAs)
35 1
appear to plan for ongoing data collection and future ex post RIA.
Few of the rule revisions by EPA and other agencies (and their
ex ante RIAs) appear to draw on ex post RIAs of the prior rules.
Although OIRA is prodding agencies to conduct retrospective
reviews under EOs 13,563, 13,579, and 13,610, and reporting the
agency responses, most of these appear to be individual rule
350. Our study team at Duke outlined this broader approach to learning from
retrospective review, in our peer review comments on the OMB/OIRA 2015 annual report.
JONATHAN B. WIENER ET AL., PEER REVIEW OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
DRAFT 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATION 5

(2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286780416-PeerReview of theUSOffice
_ofManagementandBudgetDraft_2015ReporttoCongress ontheBenefitsandCosts
_ofFederal Regulations.
351. See Miller, supra note 41. President Carter's EO 12,044, section 2(d)(8), called for
new rules to include plans for future retrospective reviews. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43
Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978). That type of ex ante planning for future ex post review could be
renewed by EO, or it could be mandated by statute; see S. 1817, 114th Cong., The Smarter
Regulations through Advance Planning and Review Act (July 21, 2015), https://www.
congress.gov/billI114th-congress/senate-bill1817 (co-sponsored by Sen. James Lankford, ROK, and Sen. Heidi Heitkamp, D-ND).
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revisions rather than ex post RIAs of the performance of
the past rule to inform the design of subsequent rule revision.
Only a small number of EPA's proposed rule changes in response
to EO 13,563 were based on a retrospective review initiative
mentioned in EPA's progress reports.
Retrospective review systems in the EU, U.K., and Australia,
while similarly generating few full ex post RIAs that test and
learn about the accuracy of ex ante RIAs, are putting in place
clearer requirements and more sophisticated frameworks for
comprehensive and regularized evaluation and learning. Their
provisions include mandatory review clauses for most or all
regulations, and the duty to prepare, publish, and submit to
oversight institutions the findings of each ex post RIA, irrespective
of a new ex ante RIA or proposed rule revisions. After the U.S.
pioneered ex ante RIA and served as the model for its international
diffusion, these other jurisdictions are now moving ahead with ex
post RIA, thereby offering opportunities for mutual learning by
comparing the unfolding institutional experience across regulatory
systems.

352

Demanding too much or too costly retrospective review could
also have perverse consequences. Agencies have limited resources
and other priorities including promulgating new rules. Imposing
a duty to prepare a full ex post RIA for every rule might be excessive,
or just lead to formalistic and symbolic results. Ex post RIA
could become just a form of monitoring and reporting indicators
during implementation, rather than truly measuring the impacts
of the existing rules compared to alternatives. 353 Some process
is needed to select the rules warranting ex post review, and to
frame the methods of ex post analysis to foster learning about the
accuracy of ex ante analysis and improved policy design. Here we
offer recommendations for the future of retrospective review.
Several factors may help explain the low levels of
implementation that this investigation and other studies have
found in retrospective review such as ex post RIA or EIA. First,
a key limitation is lack of data. Establishing monitoring
arrangements earlier, when conducting ex ante RIA or EIA and
promulgating a rule, can be important to the subsequent success of
ex post IA.354 Yet monitoring may be costly to agencies
352. See Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3; Wiener, supra note 11; DE FRANCESCO, supra
note 108.
353. This would be a gain compared to the low levels of transparency over monitoring
indicators; but this would still not amount to true ex post RIA.
354. Studies of adaptive policy management have emphasized the importance of
monitoring and reveal how adaptive approaches fail to deliver intended results when
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and regulated actors with already constrained budgets. 355 When
reducing administrative burdens is a priority, imposing even welljustified monitoring obligations can be difficult. New developments
in information and sensing technologies may enable more
comprehensive, less costly, and more effective monitoring in the
near future.35 6
Second, even with effective monitoring systems, serious
retrospective review requires more than just reporting data on
what happened under the policy. Measuring policy impacts
retrospectively requires comparing the actual policy to a
counterfactual scenario of what the world would have been
like without the policy. "It is no exaggeration to say that developing
a credible counterfactual or baseline analysis is one of the most
demanding aspects of a retrospective study." 3 5 7 Whenever these
techniques are applied, methodological rigor and transparency are
essential.
Third, agencies face (perhaps understandable) disincentives
to conducting ex post IAs of their own policies. Retrospective review
of past policies is time consuming, imposing opportunity costs
on busy agency staff who are trying to carry out the new policies
demanded by the legislature, executive, courts, and the public.
Framing retrospective review more broadly-to study the full
scope of impacts, and to learn from multiple policies about the
monitoring is defective or absent. William H. Moir & William M. Block, Adaptive Management
on Public Lands in the United States: Commitment or Rhetoric?, 28 ENVTL. MGMT. 141, 141
(2001) (arguing that monitoring is the crux of adaptive management and its weakest point);
BYRON K WILLIAMS ET AL., DEPARMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE US
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 12 (2d ed. 2009) (stating that "adaptive
management is not possible without effective monitoring"). On the need for broad monitoring
to ensure learning about full impacts and policy design, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Towards an
Effective System of Monitoring, Reporting and Verification, in TOWARDS A WORKABLE AND
EFFECTIVE CLIMATE REGIME 183-200 (Scott Barrett et al. eds., CEPR Press & FERDI ed.
2015), http://www.voxeu.org/content/towards-workable-and-effective-climate-regime.
355. Rebecca J. McLain & Robert G. Lee, Adaptive Management: Promises and Pitfalls,
20 ENVTL. MGMT. 437, 444 (1996).
356. Nicola Lettieri, Computational Social Science, the Evolution of Policy Design and
Rule Making in Smart Societies, 8 FUTURE INTERNET 1, 4-6 (2016); Melanie Swan, Sensor
Mania! The Internet of Things, Wearable Computing, Objective Metrics, and the Quantified
Self 2.0, 1 J. SENSOR & ACTUATOR NETWORKS 217 (2012); Sujan Sarker et al., Tradeoffs
Between Sensing Quality and Energy Efficiency for Context Monitoring Applications, in
PROCEEDINGS OF

2016 INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE ON NETWORKING

SYSTEMS

AND

SECURITY (NSYSS) 73, 73-80 (2016), http://iceexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs-alljsp?arnumber
=7400699; Nicholas D. Lane et al., A Survey of Mobile Phone Sensing, 48 IEEE COMM. MAG.
140 (Sept. 2010); Sensors and Sensitivity, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2009), http://www.economist.
com/node/13725679.
357. Morgenstern, RFF, supra note 24, at 2; see also ALDY, supra note 22, at 4; EC,
BETTER REGULATION TOOLBOX, supra note 189, at 270 ("When evaluating EU legislation, it
is particularly difficult to identify a robust counter-factual situation"); HM TREASURY, THE
GREEN BOOK: APPRAISAL AND EVALUATION IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

Coglianese, supranote 42, at 62-63.

45, 46-48 (2011);

64

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 32:1

accuracy of ex ante analyses-increases the social benefits of
retrospective review but also heightens the cost on agency staff.
Moreover, an ex post IA may demonstrate shortcomings in the
ex ante IA and the initial policy choice, which may be awkward
for the agency.
These considerations point to asking an outside body to
conduct the ex post LA, or to conduct the broader learning reviews
after the agency reports its own review of each rule. 35 8 Assigning
retrospective review to an outside body would relieve the agency
staff of some costs, while enabling the outside body to develop
more consistent methodologies for counterfactual scenarios. And
the outside body could use ex post analysis to promote learning
about ex ante methodologies and about policy designs, by studying
multiple policies and IAs from multiple agencies. This outside body
might be an interagency working group, an oversight body (such
as OIRA, GAO or CBO, or CEQ for EIAs), a panel of the NAS, a
think tank, or a university research institute. Yet, it is the
promulgating agency that likely has the best information and
expertise on each past policy. Thus, there will be some need for
ex post analysis of each policy by the agency, as well as for broader
multi-impact multi-policy review by an outside body.
One measure to improve current ex post IA is to increase
the transparency and access to information regarding both ex
ante and ex post IA, so that outside groups can make better use
of this information. The ex post RIA framework in the U.S. needs
to move beyond the equivocal language in section 6(b) of EO
13,563 that provides: "retrospective analyses, including supporting
data, should be released online whenever possible."3 59 Publishing
online the analytical and procedural steps and results of ex post
RIA should be the norm with exceptions only in rare cases.
Transparency is a core feature of EIA, and should be as well in
RIA. A day after President Obama gave his first inaugural
speech, he published a memorandum committing to creating "an
unprecedented level of openness in Government." 360 Here, the
358. We suggested this to OMB/OIRA in WIENER ET AL., supra note 350 (peer review
comment on 2015 annual report). See also Wiener, supra note 46 (advocating national
regulatory outcomes studies); WORLD BANK, RISK AND OPPORTUNITY: MANAGING RISK FOR

DEVELOPMENT 278 (2013) (recommending that each country establish a National Risk Board
to assess risks, resolve tradeoffs, and evaluate overall performance of existing policies).
359. (Emphasis added). See WIENER ET AL., supra note 350, at 3.
360. In the memorandum, Obama said:
Transparency promotes accountability and provides information for citizens about
what their Government is doing. Information maintained by the Federal
Government is a national asset. My Administration will take appropriate action,
consistent with law and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms that the
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Latin maxim quod non est in actis non est in mundo should be
adapted and work as the guiding principle to promote accountability
of ex post RIA requirements. It is not enough for agencies to
report that they conducted a retrospective review; the content of
that ex post analysis needs to be published. Outside experts,
oversight bodies, and reviewing courts will then be able to assess
the relation of the ex post review to full policy impacts,
proposed rule revisions, better ex ante methodologies, and better
policy designs.
With the same goal of improving transparency, the U.S. should
have a central database aggregating information about the status of
ongoing, planned, and the results of completed, ex post RIAs and
EJAs, rather than obliging researchers to search for each IA
separately at each agency. The information could be organized by
agency, year, economic significance of the rule reviewed, and links
to the online documents of the regulatory actions that precede and
follow from the review. Here, the European Commission database
offers a good example, including search functions and filters by year
and policy domain of completed ex post evaluation. 361 The U.K. also
offers a good model to emulate, with an online database containing
similar search functions and filters and assembling all the
information on ex ante and subsequent ex post RIA of primary and
secondary legislation organized by each rule. 36 2 The U.S. could take
a step further by linking to this proposed database the monitoring
data that each agency collects throughout its programs and ex post
IAs, and by building a continuous timeline of IAs through the policy
cycle of project decision or rulemaking.
Another measure to improve ex post RIA in the U.S. system is
to rethink and redesign criteria for selecting rules for ex post RIA.
The logic informing the selection of which rules undergo a review
should be similar to a CBA, assessing the net benefits of not only
rule revision but also broader learning. This is intuitively captured
by the principle of "proportionate level of analysis" in Europe and,
analytically, by methods to calculate the value of information versus
public can readily find and use. Executive departments and agencies should harness
new technologies to put information about their operations and decisions online and
readily available to the public. Executive departments and agencies should also
solicit public feedback to identify information of greatest use to the public.
Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (Feb. 24, 2009) (on file with the White House) (available at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment).
361. EC, Smart-regulationEvaluation Search, supra note 346.
362. See U.K Legislation, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.legislation.gov.uk (last visited
Jan. 21, 2017).
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the cost of information in decision science. 363 Thus, just as not every
new rule requires a full ex ante RIA, and not every federal action
requires a full EIA, so not every rule revision or existing rule should
require a full ex post RIA. The point is to select those for full ex post
analysis from which we will gain the most net benefits, including in
learning how to improve ex ante analysis accuracy and policy
design. Implementing simple rule revisions (to reduce the cost of the
rule, but without a full ex post RIA) can make sense when the
information costs are high and the learning benefits are low. The
rules selected for ex post RIA should not necessarily be the same as
the rules needing revisions. For ex post RIA to serve its learning
function, the rules selected should be those for which the most value
can be gleaned from comparing ex post to ex ante RIAs. These might
include rules that are apparently successful (not in need of revision)
as well as those that need revision. Purposive selection criteria
applied to a larger sample of rules would enhance the opportunity
to learn how to improve the accuracy of ex ante RIAs and learn
which policy designs are associated with which outcomes. This
broader learning-based ex post analysis of multiple policies and
multiple impacts might then be best handled by an interagency
group or other outside body, as noted above.
On the same logic of value of information, a good ex post RIA
should take a more comprehensive look at not only administrative
costs, but also full social costs, benefits and ancillary impacts (as
required for ex ante RIAs under Circular A-4). 3 6 4 That said, the
depth of analysis should be proportional to the significance of each
impact combined with the uncertainty around its estimates and the
opportunity to learn to improve such estimates.
Sensitivity analysis can also help in selecting existing rules for
review, planning future triggers for review of new rules, and
deciding the scope of each ex post RIA. The forecast of the effects of
a new rule (or rule revision) and the projected baseline may have
different ranges of uncertainty and valuations, influencing the
ranking of alternatives in an ex ante RIA. Sensitivity analysis can
help assess the relative importance of each input to the final
ranking of alternatives across the same scale of valuations.
Agencies and/or other actors conducting ex post RIA could
combine the purposeful selection criteria based on value of
363. See Fumie Yokota & Kimberly M. Thompson, Value of Information Literature
Analysis: A Review of Applications in Health Risk Management, 24 MED. DECISION MAKING
287-98 (2004); GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 52, at 21; Wiener, supranote 108, at 477, 482,
487, 491 (on proportionate analysis in Europe); HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS:
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
364. See OMB, A-4, supra note 103.
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information with a random selection of a representative sample
of all rules. 3 6 5 This supplemental rule selection could capture
aspects that might be overlooked in a standard value of information
selection method, such as unintended consequences (unforeseen
ancillary benefits and harms), inaccurate characterization of
uncertainty over each input, and other factors that could bias
the value of information calculus. A broader sampling approach
could also be useful in learning how different policy designs such as
instrument choice, implementation methods, and monitoring
techniques may affect variation in regulatory success. Learning is
central to both approaches, with lessons from ex post RIA leading
to improvement in methods of ex ante RIA, more accurate estimates
of costs and benefits associated with different policy designs,
and hence better design of new rules. Another important advantage
of rule selection for ex post RIA informed by calculating the value
of information, and by a representative random sampling, is to
correct the bias that seems likely to result from a selection
based on stakeholder input or public nomination of rules for
retrospective review. Although important, stakeholder views
might focus agencies' attention on rules with high costs to
specific constituencies, but might omit from ex post RIA those
other rules that might have been more socially costly (to the diffuse
public), more successful (more cost-effective, higher net benefits),
and rules that have generated ancillary impacts on populations
not organized into stakeholder groups, 366 each of which is quite
important in testing and improving the accuracy of ex ante RIA.
Beyond the stages of ex ante and ex post analysis, an even
more agile policy cycle can eventually evolve toward continuous
adaptive monitoring and updating, at least for the most important
impacts and design elements that warrant such an investment
in ongoing analysis.3 67 The selection of which rules, design elements,
and impacts would deserve such continuous monitoring and
adaptive re-evaluation will depend on the benefits of costs of
obtaining and analyzing this information. Replacing the distinction
365. For a discussion on the value and methods for studying representative samples of
rules (rather than selecting only the costliest or most visible rules, which may yield biased
inferences), see James K. Hammitt et al., PrecautionaryRegulation in Europe and the United
States: A Quantitative Comparison, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1215 (2005); Brendon Swedlow et al.,
Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk Assessment and Regulation through Comparative
Nested Analysis of Representative Cases, 31 LAW POLY 236 (2009); Jonathan B. Wiener et al.,
Better Ways to Study Regulatory Elephants, 2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 311 (2013).
366. See WIENER ET AL., supranote 350, at 5.
367. See id. at 6. For a more complete analysis, see Daniel L. Ribeiro, Adaptive
Regulatory Impact Assessment: Beyond The Foresight-HindsightDivide (SJD Dissertation,
Duke University School of Law, forthcoming 2017).
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between ex ante and ex post RIA with an ongoing system of
adaptive RIA (ARIA) would be an ambitious step. ARIA would work
by combining foresight and hindsight as a strategy and tool of
continual regulatory management. Core features of ARIA would
include the comprehensive quantification of effects, implementation
strategies conducive to counterfactual analysis (e.g., with pilot
projects and other forms of mechanism experimentation 368),
continuous monitoring systems of indicators selected with the
use of sensitivity analysis and value of information calculation,
and periodic adjustments. ARIA would provide a dynamic trigger
for regulatory adaptation, potentially leading to continually
adaptive rules. External audits could add confidence to an ARIA
system, randomly selecting rules (stratified by ranges of expected
ccsts and benefits) for validating the analyses-with the same
or new information. By embracing uncertainty and adaptation,
ARIA could dispel one significant negative incentive of ex post
RIA: instead of the idea that a policy was either right or wrong,
ARIA would instill the idea that policies are "perpetual betas,"
always learning about changing conditions and ready to adapt
when necessary. 369
Rethinking ex ante and ex post RIA systems provides a valuable
opportunity to reflect on the possibility of integrating different
evidence-based tools in a tiered deployment of different degrees
of IA to different levels of policy.3 70 There is no one-size-fits-all
type of IA that must be applied everywhere. Prospective ex ante
IA is a major advance over no IA, but ex ante IA needs to be tailored
to ensure it yields benefits in policy improvements that justify
its costs and delays. Retrospective ex post IA is a major advance
to supplement ex ante IA, but again needs tailoring to ensure its net
benefits. Retrospective review that focuses only on administrative
cost and on one rule at a time is too narrow to gain the benefits
of learning to improve ex ante forecasts and policy designs, but
that does not mean that full ex post IA must be applied everywhere.
Meanwhile, applying IA only to agency rules may be missing
opportunities to learn at other stages of the policy cycle, such as
downstream IA of enforcement and upstream IA of primary
legislation (requiring some selection process for which pending
368. See Jens Ludwig, Jeffrey R Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Mechanism Experiments
and Policy Evaluations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 17-38 (2011); see also Greenstone, supra note 47;
Lawrence E., McCray, Kenneth A. Oye & Arthur C. Petersen, Planned Adaptation in Risk
Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 951 (2010).
369. See TETLOCK & GARDNER, supra note 6, at 190 (explaining how "superforecasters"
are perpetual betas, i.e., incorporating a cycle of "try, fail, analyze, adjust, try again.").
370. Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 3.
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legislative proposals warrant analysis, and some expert body to
conduct this analysis). The concept and practice of tiering, employed
in EIA, could be applied to RIA. 37 1 Governments could experiment
with integrated systems of IAs, providing feedback data on the
entire policy cycle, from legislation to regulation to enforcement
actions.
Regulatory oversight bodies, such as U.S. OMB/OIRA and the
EU Regulatory Scrutiny Board, play a key role in ensuring the
quality of RIA systems, and in narrowing the gap between formal
3 72
adoption and implementation of both ex ante and ex post RIA.
The task is analytically and institutionally difficult, and agencies
373
To improve
can sometimes avoid oversight in various ways.
the quality of ex post RIA in the U.S., OIRA could implement several
measures. First, it could promote transparency and open access
to ex post RIA content and data by requiring that ex post RIAs be
made publicly available. Second, OIRA (or the President in a new
EO) could require that every important new proposed rule include a
plan for how the regulation will be monitored, how data will be
gathered and shared, and when a subsequent retrospective review
will be undertaken. 374 Third, OIRA could supplement Circular A-4
regarding ex ante RIA with new guidelines on selecting rules for,
and methods for conducting, ex post RIA. 3 7 5 These OIRA guidelines
for retrospective review should highlight the need to assess not only
administrative costs but rather a comprehensive scope including
full social costs, benefits, and ancillary impacts (unintended benefits
and harms). OIRA could follow the same model as the U.K. and EU
guidelines and combine in a single document its guidelines for ex
ante and ex post RIA. Fourth, OIRA itself could include, in its
annual reports to Congress on the costs and benefits of rules, not
just the aggregate sum of their ex ante estimates (as OIRA has
traditionally reported), but also the findings of ex post analyses on
those same rules, how those ex post analyses compare to the ex ante
estimates, and what can be learned about the accuracy of ex ante
3 76
If the ex
methodology and the history of actual implementation.

371. Id.
372. See Wiener, supra note 2; see also Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno,
ComparingRegulatory Oversight Bodies in the US and EU: The US Office of Information and
RegulatoryAffairs and the EU Regulatory Scrutiny Board, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW (Edward Elgar 2d ed. forthcoming 2017).
373. See Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of
OIRA, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 447 (2014).
374. See supra note 351 (regarding Carter EO 12,044 and Bill S.1817 in 114th Congress,
on prospective plans for retrospective review).
375. See Coglianese, supra note 42, at 61-62; WIENER ET AL., supra note 350, at 7.
376. WIENER ET AL., supra note 350, at 2-3; see also supra note 47.
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post information is unavailable, this itself is valuable to report.
Fifth, when exercising its oversight of ex ante RIAs of agencies'
proposed rule revisions, OIRA could better scrutinize how agencies
report the findings of the ex post RIAs (if any) of their prior ruleswhich in theory should inform the problem definition and the
baseline for the new proposed rule revision. 377 Sixth, OIRA could
convene an interagency group, a NAS panel, or another outside
group, to conduct broader retrospective reviews of multiple rules
and multiple ex ante RIAs (selected using the value of information
and representative sampling methods discussed above), in order
to test the accuracy of ex ante methodologies and the actual
performance of policy designs. OIRA could cooperate with its
counterparts in Europe and elsewhere to share learning on ex post
evaluation methods. Findings from these broader reviews might
be used by OIRA to adjust estimates in ex ante RIAs, and to revise
the guidance in Circular A-4. OIRA could seize the opportunity
offered by retrospective review to learn from hindsight how to
improve prospective foresight.
GAO should continue to play its key role in providing an extra
layer of external oversight of the RIA system by investigating the
real practice of ex ante and ex post RIA. GAO should not take at face
value the agencies' survey responses or the information in progress
reports published under EO 13,563; in addition, GAO should seek
and report the findings documented in ex post RIA reports (or, at
the very least, in the problem definition section of ex ante RIAs of
rule revisions), as already called for under EO 13,563. GAO should
emphasize the need for transparency, with open and easy access
to documentation of ex post RIA processes. In this regard, GAO
could also investigate and call attention to how an improved
U.S. database of ex ante and ex post RIAs could be developed,
borrowing from the EU and U.K.3 78
Independent external research is crucial to promote
accountability,
transparency,
and
reduce
the
adoptionimplementation gap in IA systems. Researchers should be alert
377. See WIENER ET AL., supra note 350, at 6.

378. In the U.S., there is not, in normative requirements of practice, standardization of
a central database of RIA. Part of the RIA information is published in the NPRM or in the
Final Rule, in the Federal Register and in a web page in the Regulations.gov website. These
web pages are identified by a RIN number, but there are rules without assigned RIN. The
remaining RIA information is scattered in a folder of "supporting documents," across different
files, with different names (sometimes "economic analysis," sometimes "draft RIA"). There are
rules with different files for different types of impacts; and in some cases there are many
other RIA files, of other rules, in the same folder. On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.K
and EU have central databases of RIAs, with a single digital file for each RIA. RIAs follow a
standardized format (for name and content-at least the executive summary). In the EU
database, opinions from oversight bodies are also published in the same database.
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to the possible vagueness of terms used to indicate retrospective
regulatory "review," and should be careful when designing survey
questionnaires to assess implementation of ex post RIA. 3 7 9 Surveys
used to assess the practice of IA should carefully distinguish the
meaning of terms such as "review," "evaluation" and "RIA," and
should inquire about the actual content of I. Surveys and interviews,
if used, should be complemented by descriptions of what
documented evidence was analyzed to validate the survey results. 380
The evolution of ex post IA systems offers the chance to
experiment with, and make relevant comparisons among, different
institutional designs. Different approaches to who conducts ex
post IA could be tested, both within the U.S. federal government,
and through interstate and international variation. As we have
suggested above, ex post IA could be performed by agencies,
oversight bodies (such as OIRA, GAO and CBO, or CEQ for EIA),
interagency working groups, external contractors, panels of the
NAS, think tanks, and academics.as1 Agencies and the offices within
them that promulgated the original rule may have the most
information about the rule's effects, but they may also face
incentives to avoid spending their time doing an ex post RIA amidst
other pressing demands, and to avoid criticizing their original RIA
and rule. External researchers may have better incentives to
conduct broader arrays of ex post RIAs on multiple rules and
multiple impacts, to test the accuracy of ex ante RIA methods, but
they may have less information about the rule's details than would
agency staff.
More broadly, the IA system could benefit significantly from the
creation of a transnational network of experts with access to key IA
data, building toward a global policy laboratory. 382 Testing different
approaches across borders would enhance opportunities for
comparing the IA methods (ex ante and ex post), counterfactual
scenarios, policy designs, and institutional arrangements for the
conduct and oversight of such reviews. It would also ease the path
for new adopters (in particular developing countries) of ex ante and
ex post IA systems by reducing information costs and improving
accuracy. If well developed, retrospective review can be a powerful

&

379. See supra notes 226 and 296.
380. See Radaelli, supra note 218, at 927. The OECD 2015 study itself acknowledges that
in-depth country reviews are necessary to complement the findings. See also ARDNT ET AL.,
supra note 224, at 9-10, 12-13.
381. See WIENER ET AL., supra note 350, at 7-8.
382. Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of InternationalRegulatory
Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAw
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103-36 (2015); Wiener, supra note 108, at 516.
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tool to promote a learning, adaptive, and more cost-effective path
to international regulatory cooperation. 383
VI. CONCLUSION

Good governance requires both foresight and hindsight. Back in
the 1770s, after taking Benjamin Franklin's advice on how to make
a good decision, Joseph Priestley decided to accept the offer made by
Lord Shelburne, becoming his adviser and tutor of his children.384
One of the attributes that seemed to matter most to Priestley before
his decisions was the degree to which he would be able to conduct
his own scientific research while working as a tutor. While working
under Lord Shelburne, Priestley published five of the six volumes of
his pneumatic chemistry studies, announcing the discoveries of
ammonia, sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxide, nitrogen dioxide, and
oxygen.38 5 The relationship lasted for about seven years, until
Priestley decided to leave and move to Birmingham.38 6 One cannot
help but wonder if Priestley, having used Franklin's Prudential
Algebra to make his initial decision, applied the method again to
change his plans, and whether Priestley compared the experience
ex post with how he had foreseen it ex ante. Evidently, Priestley
looked back ruefully, remarking in hindsight that "[r]eflecting on
the time that I spent with Lord Shelburne, being as a guest in the
family, I can truly say that I was not at all fascinated with that mode
of life."387 Perhaps, from his retrospective review, Priestley learned

valuable lessons for making future decisions.38 8 In other words, he
may have improved his foresight from hindsight.
Today, applying the Franklin-Priestley logic, environmental
regulation is going retro. Governments, stakeholders, and
researchers are seeking not only good ex ante analysis, but also
ex post evaluation. Following the diffusion of ex ante IA systems,
ex post IA continues to advance and diffuse across regulatory
systems. In our view, retrospective review is needed not just to
revise particular rules, and not just to reduce their costs, but to deal
with the inevitable march of change and the inescapably uncertain
character of forecasting the future effects of policies. The normative
criteria for ex ante IA-thinking ahead, considering intended and
383. Id.
384. ROBERT E. SCHOFIELD, THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF JOSEPH PRIESTLEY: A STUDY OF

HIS LIFE AND WORK FROM 1733 TO 1773, at 372 (1997).
385. Id. at 372.
386. Id.
387. RUTT, supranote 10, at 205.
388. There is also some evidence that this might have been the case, as Priestley
narrates in one of his letters that, after leaving Lord Shelburne, he received a second offer to
engage again in his service-which Priestley declined. Id. at 207.

Fall, 20161

REGULATION GOING RETRO

73

.

unintended consequences, improving accountability, and promoting
greater net benefits-should in turn require monitoring and
reassessing policy decisions by comparing prospective estimates to
retrospective observations. Yet, ex post IA has advanced more on
paper than in implementation. Ex post EIA is scant. Ex post RIA is
growing, but remains focused narrowly on revising individual rules
to reduce specific costs, rather than on learning from multiple rules
and multiple impacts to improve the accuracy of ex ante IA and to
design better policies. It also remains hidden from full view, as
retrospective reviews are often reported but not released.
Complementing ex ante IA with ex post IA has the potential to
advance a continual learning process, in which the ability to foresee
the future consequences of today's policy decisions becomes stronger
via learning from past efforts. Ex post IA has been sought by
presidential orders and statutory mandates for decades, yet remains
elusive. There are reasons to expect better results with increased
transparency, enhancements to analytic approaches, improved
roles for oversight bodies, study of multiple impacts and multiple
rules to test and improve the accuracy of ex ante IAs and policy
designs, a greater role for outside experts, and networks to
experiment and compare findings across jurisdictions. Through
these and other steps we may yet learn better foresight from
hindsight.

